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INTRODUCTION
We live in a time when our right to speak out against our government 
faces threats unimagined since the Vietnam era.  As the present war in 
Iraq and the campaign against international terrorism have dragged on, 
the federal and state governments as well as nongovernmental institutions 
have grown increasingly bold in their efforts to suppress political dissent.  
Law enforcement officers infiltrate and bully peaceful dissident groups; 
police crack down brutally on mass demonstrations; cities confine 
protesters at major political events to ironically designated “free speech 
zones.”2  These events buttress a contention, familiar from the work of 
several prominent First Amendment theorists, that the Supreme Court can 
succeed in protecting crucial political dissent under the First Amendment 
only by aiming its free speech jurisprudence primarily or even 
exclusively at protecting speech that contributes to political discourse.3
Unbinding political speech from expression whose regulation the 
government can more plausibly justify under the balancing analysis now 
applied in all free speech cases would maximize the Constitution’s 
protection for the category of expressive activity most central to the 
health of our democratic system.
This democracy-focused approach to expressive freedom, however, 
has long struggled against the far more influential idea that the Free 
Speech Clause exists to guarantee individual autonomy.4  The Court’s 
substantial embrace of the autonomy principle reflects the intuitive appeal 
of an autonomy-based conception of rights and the cost a democracy-
focused approach to the First Amendment could exact in suppression of 
nonpolitical speech.  Deepening protection for political speech by 
narrowing the First Amendment’s scope would entail compromising 
protection of nonpolitical expression, including much art, sexually 
explicit speech, and commercial advertising.  Present First Amendment 
1 Professor of Law, Villanova University.  Thanks to Michelle Anderson, Les Book, 
Steve Chanenson, Marisa Cianciarulo, and workshop participants at the University of 
Kentucky and University of Wisconsin Law Schools for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
2 For a discussion of these tactics, see infra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
3 For a discussion of this democracy-focused approach to the First Amendment, see 
infra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
4 For a discussion of this autonomy-centered approach to the First Amendment, see 
infra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
2doctrine privileges breadth over depth of constitutional protection, giving 
all behavior that fits the descriptive category “speech” the same 
presumption of protection against government regulation, contingent 
upon the universal proviso that government may regulate the content of 
expression where necessary to effectuate compelling interests.5  Although 
the present approach reflects many people’s deep intuitions about the 
importance of all kinds of speech for individual autonomy, it dilutes the 
First Amendment’s protection of political speech by allowing even trivial 
government interests to trump the expressive interest in advancing 
political debate.
An ideal regime of expressive freedom would protect political debate 
with the depth of the democracy-focused First Amendment paradigm 
while simultaneously casting a broad enough net to safeguard the 
personal autonomy interests advanced by speech that has nothing to do 
with politics.  The Supreme Court recently opened a path toward such an 
ideal regime – a path that would expand constitutional speech protection 
beyond the First Amendment.  In 2003, the Court held in the landmark 
case of Lawrence v. Texas6 that state bans on sodomy violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee.  Lawrence has potential 
importance for speech protection because of the decision’s two boldest 
elements: its sweeping equation of substantive due process with the 
normative value of personal autonomy and its prohibition of state 
regulations that rest purely on moral disapproval of behavior.  By 
establishing that the Due Process Clause safeguards behavior integral to 
personal autonomy, the Court created an alternative repository for the 
idea that nonpolitical speech essential to personal autonomy deserves 
constitutional protection.7  By interposing the Due Process Clause against 
moral regulations, the Court replicated in the substantive due process 
setting the antipathy for official attacks on socially undesirable ideas that 
animates much present First Amendment doctrine.8
This article proposes that the Court fulfill the speech-protective 
potential of Lawrence by transplanting the Constitution’s protection for 
nonpolitical speech – speech that primarily serves the interest in personal 
autonomy as distinct from the interest in democratic debate – from the 
First Amendment to the Due Process Clause.  Invoking substantive due 
process to protect nonpolitical speech creates an unprecedented 
opportunity to deepen the First Amendment’s protection of political 
speech while improving on present First Amendment doctrine in 
effectuating the broad consensus for protecting speech that primarily 
serves personal autonomy.  The First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause 
5 For further discussion of the centrality of undifferentiated balancing of interests to 
present First Amendment doctrine, see infra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
6 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
7 See infra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
3would assume a coherent focus based on the importance of political 
debate for a healthy democratic system.  At the same time, the 
Constitution would protect nonpolitical expression based not on the arid 
premise that such expression is formally “speech” but on the crucial 
understanding that nonpolitical expression, to the extent it advances 
personal autonomy, benefits society as surely as political expression does, 
although in a materially different way.
The article proceeds in three parts.  The first part establishes both the 
wisdom and the difficulty of focusing First Amendment doctrine on 
political speech.  It first establishes the need for such a focus by 
describing the government’s campaign against political dissent since the 
2001 terrorist attacks.  It then acknowledges and explores the cost of such 
a focus for nonpolitical expression.  Finally, it describes and criticizes 
First Amendment theorists’ prior attempts to realize the benefit while 
minimizing the cost.  The article’s second part explains how the Supreme 
Court’s Lawrence decision facilitates shifting constitutional protection of 
nonpolitical speech from the First Amendment to the Due Process Clause.  
The final part examines what difference a shift to due process protection
would make for constitutional doctrine in three important, controversial 
areas of substantially nonpolitical speech: artistic and cultural expression, 
pornography, and commercial advertising.  Shielding nonpolitical 
expression behind the Due Process Clause rather than the First 
Amendment would expand some aspects of constitutional speech 
protection beyond their present scope while diminishing others.  Invoking 
the Due Process Clause rather than the First Amendment to protect 
expression that primarily serves personal autonomy rather than political 
discourse would strengthen the theoretical bases for constitutionally 
shielding both categories of speech.
I. THE PUBLIC RIGHTS THEORY OF EXPRESSIVE FREEDOM 
AND THE PROBLEM OF NONPOLITICAL SPEECH
A. Why Limit the First Amendment to Protecting Only Political 
Speech?
1. Private Rights vs. Public Rights in Free Speech Theory
The dominant influence on the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence over the past three decades has been what I have labeled 
the private rights theory of expressive freedom.9  The private rights 
theory treats the First Amendment as a guarantor of individual 
autonomy.10  That emphasis on autonomy generates a formal vision of 
9 For a detailed portrayal of the private rights theory, see Gregory P. Magarian, 
Regulating Political Parties Under a “Public Rights” First Amendment, 44 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1939, 1947-59 (2003) (hereinafter Magarian, Public Rights).
10 For further discussion of the idea of autonomy that animates the private rights 
4expressive freedom.11  A regulation or action raises a First Amendment 
concern whenever the government abridges expressive opportunities that 
individuals or entities secure in the private marketplace.12  The private 
rights theory requires negative protection against government action 
rather than identifying any affirmative purpose of expressive freedom.  
Accordingly, it extends First Amendment protection to all expression 
without regard to category.  Because such broad protection threatens to 
limit a wide range of government authority, the private rights theory 
employs a balancing methodology, manifest in the Supreme Court’s 
familiar framework of tiered means-ends scrutiny, which allows many 
government restrictions on speech to survive First Amendment review.13
  While frequently mouthing the platitude that political expression has 
special significance under the First Amendment,14 the Supreme Court 
over the past three decades has on numerous occasions employed the 
private rights theory’s balancing methodology to uphold government 
restrictions on political debate and dissent.15  Most such decisions have 
turned on the Court’s subjecting speech restrictions deemed content-
neutral and restrictions that apply to speech on ordinary government 
property to more lenient judicial review than it imposes on content-based 
regulations of speech on private property or in “public forums.”  An 
illustrative case is Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence,16 in 
which advocates for increased government attention to the problem of 
homelessness sought to dramatize their agenda by sleeping in tents 
erected in Lafayette Square Park, in view of the White House.  The Court, 
ignoring the distinctive impact of this form of political advocacy, allowed 
the government to suppress it under a regulation that restricted sleeping in 
national parks.17  The private rights theory has allowed the Court to 
theory, see infra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
11 See id. at 1954-56.
12 See id. at 1957-58.
13 See id. at 1958-59.
14 Recent examples include Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (emphasizing 
need for First Amendment protection of cross burning that constitutes “core political 
speech”); Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775 (2002) (claiming that “speech about 
the qualifications of candidates for public office” is “a category of speech that is ‘at the core 
of our First Amendment freedoms’”) (quoting Republican Party v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 861, 
863 (8th Cir. 2001)); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386 (2000) (echoing 
statement in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S 1, 16 (1976), that “the constitutional [First 
Amendment] guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct 
of campaigns for political office”); Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 
182, 186 (1999) (characterizing First Amendment protection as at its “zenith” for “core 
political speech”).
15 For a detailed discussion of recent government suppression of political debate, some 
of it sanctioned by federal courts, see infra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
16 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
17 See id. at ___.  For a similar ruling in a different setting, see Cornelius v. NAACP 
Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (upholding restriction on political 
groups’ access to public employee charity campaign on ground that campaign was 
government property and “nonpublic forum”).
5uphold restrictions on political expression in other cases by deeming a 
speaker’s invocation of regulatory mandates to allow expression, and not 
a government-facilitated decision to restrict speech, as the “public” action 
subject to constitutional sanction.  In CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.,18
for example, the Court rejected antiwar advertisers’ First Amendment 
challenge to the major broadcast networks’ refusal to sell them 
advertising time.  A plurality dismissed out of hand the idea that the 
networks’ public licenses imbued them with quasi-governmental 
authority and thus First Amendment obligations.19
A series of First Amendment theorists beginning with Alexander 
Meiklejohn20 has developed an alternative, sharply contrasting account of 
the Free Speech Clause, which I have labeled the public rights theory of 
expressive freedom.21  The public rights theory views the free speech 
guarantee of the First Amendment not as a negative protection against 
government interference with personal autonomy but rather as a means to 
the end of democratic government.22  Under the public rights theory, the 
central purpose of the Free Speech Clause is to ensure that members of 
the political community receive the information they need to make 
informed decisions about matters of public policy.23  Because that 
purpose is both narrow and critically important, the public rights theory 
rejects the balancing methodology of the private rights theory in favor of 
a categorical approach that would give the First Amendment virtually 
absolute force against threats to political discourse.24  The practical 
consequence of the public rights theory is that the government may 
restrict access to political expression – in Meiklejohn’s phrase, “the 
consideration of matters of public interest”25 – only where necessary to 
safeguard political debate itself.26 Writing in the late 1940s and early 
18 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
19 See id. at 121 (“Application of [First Amendment] standards to broadcast licensees 
would be antithetical to the very idea of vigorous, challenging debate on issues of public 
interest.”).
20 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS 
OF THE PEOPLE (1965).
21 For a detailed portrayal of the public rights theory, see Magarian, Public Rights, 
supra note [x], at 1972-90.  The most important contributors to the public rights tradition 
after Meiklejohn are Owen Fiss and Cass Sunstein.  See Owen Fiss, Why the State?, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987) (hereinafter Fiss, Why the State?); Owen Fiss, Free Speech and 
Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986); Cass Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 255 (1992). 
22 See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note [x], at 1983-84.  Vicki Jackson has recently 
pointed out that a politically focused theory of expressive freedom draws support from the 
ascent, after the First Amendment’s enactment, of equal citizenship and popular election of 
representatives as central features in our constitutional order.  See Vicki C. Jackson, 
Holistic Interpretation, Comparative Constitutionalism, and Fiss-ian Freedoms, 58 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 265, 295 & n.119 (2003).
23 See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note [x], at 1983-85.
24 See id. at 1987-88.
25 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note [x], at 79.
26 See id. at 48-49.  Meiklejohn drew this idea from Justice Brandeis’ concurrence in 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), from which he approvingly quoted the 
61950s, he saw pressing national challenges that made pluralistic, 
participatory democracy critically important, even as governmental and 
societal pressures strangled the political dissent necessary for democratic 
engagement.27  Treating political speech as the central object of 
expressive freedom ensures that the First Amendment will not fail in its 
essential purpose of fostering and facilitating self-government.
No less significant a pair of strange bedfellows than Robert Bork and 
Cass Sunstein has elaborated the case for limiting the First Amendment’s 
scope to encompass only political speech, although their arguments 
follow widely divergent courses of reasoning.  According to Bork, courts 
must focus the First Amendment on political expression in order to avoid 
the judicial activism that protecting any less constitutionally grounded 
categories of expression would entail.28  For Sunstein, reserving the First 
Amendment’s core for political speech would both effectuate the 
Constitution’s central purpose of fostering public deliberation and leave 
speech that hinders the development of popular sovereignty open to 
certain kinds of regulation.29  Although neither Bork nor Sunstein shares 
Meiklejohn’s contemporaneous fear for the fate of political dissent, both 
echo his conclusion that ensuring effective First Amendment protection 
for political expression requires elevating political speech over other 
categories of expression.
Focusing the First Amendment on political speech, however, entails a 
critical tradeoff.  If the First Amendment is to provide virtually absolute 
protection for political discourse, then courts must categorically 
distinguish political from nonpolitical speech.  For Meiklejohn, 
nonpolitical expression – art, entertainment, scientific inquiry – is 
“private speech,” outside the logical boundaries of First Amendment 
protection.30  Like a sailor who throws excess weight off a sinking ship, 
Meiklejohn calls for sacrificing what he considers less essential 
categories of speech in order to ensure thorough protection of the one 
category – political speech – most integral to the nation’s democratic 
fortunes.  Public rights theorists generally maintain that only a tradeoff of 
proposition that “no danger flowing from speech can be judged clear and present, unless the 
incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is 
opportunity for full discussion.”  Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
27 For a detailed account of Meiklejohn’s intellectual process in developing his First 
Amendment theory, with particular attention to the influence of anticommunism run amok, 
see ADAM R. NELSON, EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY: THE MEANING OF ALEXANDER 
MEIKLEJOHN 1872-1964, at 263-295 (2001).
28 See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1, 20 (1971).  Even as Bork advocates the centrality of political expression, he departs 
significantly from the public rights theory by endorsing criminalization of speech that 
advocates forcible overthrow of the government.  See id.
29 See Sunstein, supra note [x], at 305.
30 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note [x], at 79-80 (discussing private speech generally); id.
at 83-84 (characterizing scholarly pursuits, particularly in the sciences, as partially 
private); id. at 86-66 (criticizing commercial radio as reflecting private rather than public 
interests).
7broad protection, which encompasses a wide range of speech but subjects 
it to judicial balancing against countervailing regulatory priorities, for 
deep protection, limited to political speech but virtually absolute in its 
resistance to suppression, will lead to a First Amendment regime 
sufficient to protect vigorous political debate and dissent.
2. The Recent Surge in Suppression of Political Dissent
Although the private rights theory of expressive freedom has 
dominated judicial and scholarly discourse for at least the past three 
decades,31 it may be on a collision course with history.  Present 
circumstances provide strong support for the premise, developed in the 
context of the public rights theory, that the Supreme Court’s broad, 
balancing-oriented approach to the First Amendment yields inadequate 
constitutional protection for political speech.
Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks, nationalist fervor and 
national security concerns have created a hostile climate for political 
debate and dissent in the United States.  Elsewhere I have documented the 
recent increase in nongovernmental institutions’ suppression of political 
expression.32  In the more traditional zone of First Amendment concern, 
federal and state law enforcement officials have dramatically increased 
their efforts to intimidate, marginalize, and silence political dissenters.  A 
spokesman for the California Anti-Terrorism Information Center 
exemplifies present official attitudes toward dissent: “If you have a 
protest group protesting a war where the cause that’s being fought against 
is international terrorism, you might have terrorism at that protest. You 
can almost argue that a protest against that is a terrorist act.”33 In the rare 
recent instances when federal courts have entertained First Amendment 
challenges to government attacks on political dissent, they have employed 
the balancing methodology of the private rights theory to justify those 
attacks.
The new wave of official aggression against political protestors first 
made national headlines in November 1999, when Seattle police greeted 
protestors against a World Trade Organization meeting with pepper spray, 
concussion grenades, and rubber bullets, and the mayor created a “no 
protest zone” around the Seattle Convention Center.34  In the wake of the 
Seattle debacle, cities that host high-profile public events have routinely 
31 See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note [x], at 1951-52 (discussing dominance of 
private rights theory).
32 See Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment, the Public-Private Distinction, and 
Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 G.W.U. L. REV. 101, 115-27 
(2004) (hereinafter Magarian, Wartime Debate).
33 Michelle Goldberg, Outlawing Dissent, Salon.com (Feb. 11, 2004), at
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2004/02/11/cointelpro/print.html (last visited Oct. 12, 
2004) (quoting Mike Van Winkle).
34 See Patrick F. Gillham & Gary T. Marx, Complexity and Irony in Policing and 
Protesting: The World Trade Organization in Seattle, 27 SOC. JUST. 212, [page] (2000).
8restricted protestors within security perimeters and “free speech zones,” 
defending these measures as law enforcement necessities.  During the 
2000 Democratic National Convention, for example, the Los Angeles 
Police Department established a security perimeter around the Staples 
Center that kept protestors 260 yards away from convention delegates.  A 
federal judge, however, ruled that perimeter unconstitutional, finding its 
size and around-the-clock enforcement not narrowly tailored to the 
government’s interest in public safety.35
The September 11th attacks appear to have eroded federal courts’ 
resolve against antiprotest measures.   In July 2004, two protest groups 
requested a preliminary injunction to prevent the City of Boston from 
designating a 300-foot by 90-foot space under abandoned subway tracks 
as the “free speech zone” for the 2004 Democratic National Convention.36
The zone was “surrounded by two rows of concrete barriers,” each topped 
with an eight-foot high chain link fence covered in tightly woven mesh 
fabric.  Looser mesh netting attached the top of fence to the subway 
tracks above, which were wrapped in razor wire.  A federal judge 
described the space as “a grim, mean, and oppressive space” that created 
an impression “of an internment camp” or “a holding pen where 
potentially dangerous persons are separated from others.”37  He stressed 
that the design of the zone “is an offense to the spirit of the First 
Amendment. . . a brutish and potentially unsafe place for citizens who 
wish to exercise their First Amendment rights.”38  Nonetheless, he refused 
to enjoin the zone, citing the constraints of the physical location and law 
enforcement’s safety concerns as barriers to a solution that would 
“vindicate plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.”39  Less than a month later, 
another federal judge sustained the New York City Parks Department’s 
decision to deny the National Council of Arab Americans a permit to 
protest on the Great Lawn during the 2004 Republican National 
Convention.40  Although the court acknowledged the site’s symbolic 
value for the protestors, it held that the government’s interest in 
maintaining the park outweighed their interest in symbolic expression.41
When protestors have ventured outside their cages, they have learned 
35 See Service Employee Int’l Union et. al v. City of Los Angeles et. al, 114 F. Supp. 2d 
966, 971 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that designated security zone unconstitutionally 
infringed protestors’ First Amendment rights). 
36 See Coalition to Protest the Democratic Nat’l Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. 
Supp. 2d 61 (D. Mass. 2004), aff’d, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004).
37 Id. at 67, 74-75.
38 Id. at 76.
39 Id.
40 See Nat’l Council of Arab Americans v. City of New York, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16628 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2004) (characterizing defendants’ interest in maintaining and 
managing public park as significant government interest).
41 See id. at *11, *41 (recognizing plaintiffs’ belief that location was symbolic but 
denying plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunction due to doctrine of laches and plaintiffs’ 
failure to show likelihood of success on merits). 
9firsthand about the power of law enforcement.  In October 2003, federal 
agents arrested a retired steelworker and his sister after they refused to 
move their anti-Bush sign to a designated “free speech area” at a 
campaign rally in Pittsburgh.42  Based on this and numerous similar 
incidents, the ACLU filed suit against the Secret Service, contending that 
segregating protestors violated their constitutional rights.43  Although the 
Secret Service pledged to discontinue segregating protestors,44 the 
practice continues.  When President Bush appeared at the West Virginia 
Capitol for a July 4, 2004 campaign rally, police arrested a young couple 
wearing anti-Bush t-shirts and charged them with trespassing – on public 
property.45  In September 2004, a woman wearing a t-shirt stenciled 
“President Bush You Killed My Son,” to protest her son’s death in Iraq, 
shouted questions at First Lady Laura Bush during a campaign speech.  
New Jersey police arrested her for defiant trespass even though she had a 
ticket to attend the rally. 46
Government officials have also used aggressive investigation and 
questioning to intimidate people who express dissenting political views.   
In November 2001, FBI and Secret Service agents appeared at a small 
Houston art museum and interrogated a curator for over an hour about a 
new exhibit called “Secret Wars,” which focused on covert government 
operations.47  In November 2003, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Iowa 
served Drake University with a subpoena demanding information about 
an on-campus anti-war demonstration sponsored by the University’s NLG 
chapter.48  The government claimed the subpoena was necessary for the 
investigation of a single trespassing incident on nearby National Guard 
42 See Dave Lindorff, Keeping dissent invisible, Salon.com (Oct. 16, 2003) 
(documenting protestor’s arrest for disorderly conduct when he refused to display sign “The 
Bushes must love the poor – they’ve made so many of us” in segregated area behind chain 
link fence). http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2003/10/16/secret_service/print.html (last 
visited Aug. 16, 2004).
43 See id. (describing ACLU’s findings of at least 17 similar incidents in seven states 
and ACLU suit against Secret Service).
44 See Jennifer Bundy, Couple arrested for wearing anti-Bush T-shirts to W. Va. event 
sues federal officials, BOSTON GLOBE (Sep. 14, 2004) (noting Secret Service agreed to 
discontinue segregation policy), available at
http://www.boston.com/dailynews/258/nation/Couple_arrested_for_wearing_an:.shtml (last 
visited Sep. 15, 2004).
45 See id. (describing couple’s arrest for trespass at Bush appearance).
46 See Soldier’s mom interrupts Laura Bush’s speech, CNN.com (Sep. 20, 2004), at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/09/17/bush.protestor/index.html (last visited Sep. 
28, 2004).  The Secret Service is currently deciding whether the woman, Sue Niederer, 
violated a federal law banning threats to kill the president when she told an online 
magazine that “she wanted to ‘rip the president’s head off’”.  Secret Service Reviews 
Comments By Dead Soldier’s Mom, WNBC.com (Sep. 22, 2004), at
http://www.wnbc.com/print/3751305/detail.html (last visited Sep. 28, 2004).  
47 See Kris Axtman, Political Dissent Can Bring Federal Agents to the Door, CHRISTIAN 
SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 8, 2002, at 1.
48 See Monica Davey, Subpoenas on Anti-War Protest Dropped, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 
2004, at A18 (discussing subpoena issued to Drake University for participant and content 
information about NLG-sponsored antiwar forum), available at http://www.why-
war.com/news/2004/02/11/subpoena.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2004). 
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property.  Only mounting public pressure led the U.S. Attorney to 
withdraw the subpoena in February 2004.49  FBI officials have 
interrogated political demonstrators in advance of several public events, 
including the 2004 Democratic and Republican National Conventions.50
The Department of Justice has also investigated people associated with 
Internet sites the government deems subversive of U.S. interests.  Relying 
extensively upon its powers under the U.S.A. Patriot Act,51 the 
Department has charged website owners whose sites contain incendiary 
information with “provid[ing] ‘expert advice or assistance’” to 
terrorists.52  Other objects of FBI and Secret Service attention have 
included a middle-aged Californian who criticized President Bush’s ties 
to oil companies during a conversation at his gym53 and a North Carolina 
college freshman who displayed a poster in her dorm room that criticized 
President Bush’s record on capital punishment as governor of Texas.54
The First Amendment is supposed to protect the right to protest 
government action, even when the protestor departs from prevailing 
notions of civility.55  But numerous people who have mounted peaceful 
protests against the present government have paid for their efforts in 
blood, liberty, or positions in government institutions.  In November 
2001, the School of the Americas, a controversial operation that trains 
foreign nationals in military tactics, cracked down on an annual, 
nonviolent demonstration at Fort Bening, claiming the protest “was not 
appropriate during the war on terrorism.”56  Although the event remained 
49 See id.
50 See Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Goes Knocking for Political Troublemakers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 16, 2004, at A1 (discussing FBI interviews of “past protestors and their friends and 
family members” in six states in weeks prior to both 2004 political conventions) (hereinafter 
Lichtblau, Knocking). 
51 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 
2001).
52 Eric Lipton & Eric Lichtblau, Even Near Home, a New Front Is Opening in the 
Terror Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 23, 2004, at A12.  In 2003 the government leveled such 
charges against Sami Omar al-Hussayen, a recently emigrated PhD candidate, after he 
established websites devoted to Middle East news that cheered suicide attacks.  A federal 
judge allowed the case to reach a jury.  Despite scouring “files and files and files of 
evidence,” the jurors acquitted al-Hussayen because they could find no evidence that he was 
affiliated with a terrorist organization.  Id. (quoting juror).  Similar charges are pending 
against a British citizen, but British authorities so far have refused to extradite the 
defendant to the United States.  See id. (discussing charges pending against Babar Ahmad 
in federal district court in Connecticut).
53 See Matthew Rothschild, The New McCarthyism, PROGRESSIVE, Jan. 2002, at 18.
54 See Axtman, supra note [x].  For a discussion of other recent instances in which 
federal law enforcement officers have investigated or pressured people who displayed or 
created works that satirized the Bush Administration, see Lauren Gilbert, Mocking George: 
Political Satire as “True Threat” in the Age of Global Terrorism, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 843, 
847-53 (2004).
55 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (invoking First Amendment to overturn 
conviction of antidraft protestor for wearing “Fuck the Draft” t-shirt in courthouse).
56 Father Roy Bourgeois, founder of Schools of the Americas Watch, quoted in Alisa 
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nonviolent, law enforcement officials arrested and prosecuted dozens of 
protestors on trespassing charges.57  A year later, Miami police attacked 
protestors who marched in opposition to a Free Trade Area of the 
Americas meeting.58  When police announced over a bullhorn that the 
demonstration would continue only if it remained peaceful, a protestor 
responded, “Does that include police violence?”  The police replied with 
batons, tear gas, rubber bullets, pepper spray, and concussion grenades.59
The congressionally funded United States Institute of Peace forced a 
conflict resolution trainer to resign because of her public statements 
criticizing U.S. foreign policy.60  The University of South Florida fired a 
tenured professor for harshly criticizing Israel.61  A West Virginia high 
school suspended a student for wearing a t-shirt that said “Racism, 
Sexism, Homophobia, I’m So Proud of People in the Land of the So-
Called Free,” and the West Virginia Supreme Court upheld the 
suspension.62  Officials got away with these actions despite the First 
Amendment’s ostensible protection of political expression by public 
employees63 and students.64
Infiltration and monitoring of peaceful political groups violates 
political dissenters’ First Amendment right of political association,65 and
it also offends First Amendment principles by casting the very act of 
opposing the government as legally suspect, and – if the government 
strategically publicizes the monitoring – by chilling expression.  
Nonetheless, government infiltration and monitoring of dissenters, so 
infamous from the days of McCarthyism and COINTELPRO,66 has 
reemerged during the present campaign against terrorism.  After the 
September 11 attacks, Attorney General John Ashcroft loosened 
guidelines for federal investigations, in order to ensure that “if there is a 
rally of people who are criticizing the United States and its policies and 
saying that the United States will someday perhaps be destroyed because 
Solomon, Things We Lost in the Fire, VILLAGE VOICE, September 17, 2002, at 32.
57 Solomon, supra note [x].
58 See Ben Manski, Massacre in Miami? It Was a Defeat for Protestors, CAPITAL TIMES, 
Nov. 27, 2003, at 13A. Miami police had prepared for the meeting by stockpiling riot gear, 
erecting “an 8-foot high security fence around the protest zone” and setting up a “rumor 
control” hotline to field calls about alleged protests.  Tamara Lush, Trade Talks Put Miami 
on Edge, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 17, 2003, at 1A.
59 See Manski, supra note [x], at 13A.
60 See Rothschild, supra note [x].
61 See Solomon, supra note [x].
62 See Rothschild, supra note [x].
63 See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 390 U.S. 986 (1968) (holding that First Amendment 
barred Board of Education from firing teacher for making public statements critical of 
board’s policies).
64 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that 
First Amendment barred public school from suspending students for wearing black 
armbands to protest Vietnam War).
65 Cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (rejecting on First Amendment grounds 
state’s demand for civil rights group’s membership list).
66 See Goldberg, supra note [x].
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of that, the FBI agent can go and listen to what’s being said.”67  In 2003, 
the FBI encouraged local law enforcement officials to monitor antiwar 
groups and political protests for signs of terrorist activity,68 and the 
federal government has poured funding into local “red squads.”69  When 
an FBI employee argued that those mandates confused protected speech 
with illegal activity, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel 
declared the activity constitutionally appropriate.70  Since then groups 
across the nation, including the Colorado Coalition Against the War in 
Iraq, the American Friends Service Committee, and Peace Fresno have 
reported undercover officers’ infiltrating their organizations.71
In an effort to publicize government assaults on political dissent, the 
ACLU and the Center for National Security Studies filed Freedom of 
Information Act requests for statistics regarding the Justice Department’s 
post-September 11th activities.  When the Department denied each 
request, the groups filed suit in federal district court; in each case, the 
court sided with the government.  One federal judge upheld the Justice 
Department’s refusal to release general statistics regarding its use of 
various surveillance and investigatory tools authorized by the Patriot Act, 
holding that the Department’s interest in protecting national security 
justified secrecy.72  Another federal judge held that the Patriot Act’s 
national security exemption protected the Department’s refusal to turn 
over statistics regarding the frequency of its requests for “tangible things 
in an ‘authorized investigation.’”73  The court cited longstanding 
deference to the Executive Branch regarding national security matters and 
asserted judicial incompetence to “second-guess the executive’s 
judgment” on national security.74  These decisions validated an 
unprecedented government effort to diminish the public’s access to 
information about the people’s business.75
67 Id. (quoting Attorney General Ashcroft in 2002 interview). 
68 See Lichtblau, Knocking, supra note [x] (discussing FBI mandates to local law 
enforcement agencies regarding monitoring of political dissenters and internal complaint 
filed by employee citing concerns about mandates’ infringement of constitutional free speech 
protections).   
69 See Solomon, supra note [x].
70 See Lichtblau, Knocking, supra note [x] (quoting Department of Justice opinion as 
saying “given the limited nature of such public monitoring, any possible ‘chilling’ effect 
caused by the bulletins would be quite minimal and substantially outweighed by the public 
interest in maintaining safety and order during large-scale demonstrations”).
71 See Goldberg, supra note [x]. 
72 American Civil Liberties Union v. United States Department of Justice, 265 F. 
Supp. 2d 20 (D. D.C. 2003).
73 American Civil Liberties Union v. United States Department of Justice, 321 F. 
Supp. 2d 24 (D. D.C. 2004).
74 Id. at 36.
75 See Eric Lichtblau, Government Shrinking Access to Information, MILWAUKEE 
JOURNAL-SENTINEL, Nov. 22, 2001, at 28A (describing general increase in government 
secrecy in wake of September 11 attacks); On the Public’s Right To Know: The Day Ashcroft 
Censored Freedom of Information, S.F. CHRONICLE, Jan. 6, 2002, at D4 (discussing 
memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft that “vigorously urged federal agencies 
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The First Amendment is supposed to ensure that the news media can 
vigorously pursue and report news about government actions and 
proceedings.76  But the Bush administration, through control of access to 
information and occasional overt pressure, has eviscerated the news 
media’s traditional watchdog role, a process that media corporations’ 
frequent self-censorship has made shamefully easy.77   One particularly 
important instance of heightened government secrecy is a federal policy, 
issued within days of the 2001 attacks and altering decades of past 
practice, of reflexively closing deportation hearings on national security 
grounds.78   Under that policy, the Department of Justice holds unfettered 
discretion to designate any immigration proceeding a “special interest” 
matter, based on a belief that the immigrant “might have connections 
with, or possess information pertaining to, terrorist activities against the 
United States.”79  A “special interest” designation requires courts to seal 
the case file; remove the case from the docket; and bar the detainee’s 
family, visitors, and reporters from the proceedings.80  This policy has 
allowed the government to decide the fates of hundreds of immigrants 
without the accountability that open proceedings ensure.81  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has upheld the policy 
against constitutional challenge,82 although the Sixth Circuit has 
to resist most Freedom of Information Act requests made by American citizens”).
76 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (holding that 
“the right [of the press and public] to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of 
the First Amendment”); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (refusing 
to enjoin publication of the Pentagon Papers, leaked government documents related to 
national security).
77 See Magarian, Wartime Debate, supra note [x], at 117-121 (documenting instances of 
misinformation and suppression of information by U.S. news media since 2001 terrorist 
attacks).
78 See Directive of Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy to All Immigration 
Judges, Court Administrators (Sept. 21, 2001) (detailing procedures for special interest 
deportation hearings), at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/creppy092101memo.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2005) (hereinafter Creepy Directive).  The Creppy Directive altered a 
longstanding policy that deportation proceedings were open to the public.  See Detroit Free 
Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 701 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Since 1965 INS regulations have 
explicitly required deportation hearings to be presumptively open.”) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.27). 
79 North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(quoting declaration of Dale L. Watson, Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism 
and Counterintelligence at Federal Bureau of Investigation), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1056 
(2003). 
80 See Creppy Directive, supra note [x].
81 An estimated 600 detainees endured closed hearings through mid-2003.  See Heidi 
Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: Considering the Right to Know in 
the Administrative State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 95–96 (2004) (citing figure 
provided by Solicitor General Theodore Olsen in brief opposing writ of certiorari in North 
Jersey Media Group).  Despite evidence that almost none of the people subjected to closed 
deportation hearings have terrorist connections, the Department has continued to close 
hearings.  See id. at 96 & n.8 (noting Department of Justice’s acknowledgment that most 
detainees did not have information regarding terrorist activities).  The Department has 
publicly suggested it may reconsider the Creepy Directive.  See Behind Closed Doors, INT’L 
HERALD, May 31, 2003, at 6 (quoting Department as saying that procedures for closed 
hearings might “likely be revised”).  At this time, however, the policy appears unchanged.  
82 See North Jersey Media Group, supra (holding Creppy Directive constitutional 
14
disagreed;83 meanwhile, the D.C. Circuit has upheld the government’s 
refusal even to provide a count of hearings closed under the policy.84
The threat of unaccountable deportation does not, of course, represent 
our government’s only recent assault on resident foreign nationals.  The 
First Amendment supposedly protects the expressive rights of 
noncitizens,85 and that protection should carry special importance to the 
extent citizens care about maximizing the presence of diverse viewpoints 
in domestic political debate.86  Those considerations, however, have not 
stopped the government from using the exceptional leverage it holds over 
foreign nationals in the United States to suppress their political 
association and expression.  Government actions, most prominently the 
broad and seemingly arbitrary practice of questioning and often detaining 
noncitizens for alleged associations with asserted terrorists, have 
effectively chilled immigrant communities from speaking out on political 
issues that strongly affect their interests.87
We assume the First Amendment will protect political dissent.  In the 
past four years, however, the First Amendment has failed in that essential 
task.  Federal courts, employing our present, broad but shallow 
understanding of the First Amendment, have allowed the government’s 
national security shibboleth to overwhelm the interest in political debate 
crucial to sustaining our democratic system.  Most muffled dissenters 
have never even gone to court, many certainly because of the costs of 
litigation but others, no doubt, because they have concluded from the 
shape of present free speech doctrine that a court would only validate 
government censorship.   This failure provides powerful support for the 
tradeoff urged by the public rights theory of expressive freedom: narrow 
the scope of the Free Speech Clause to cover only political expression, in 
order to maximize protection of that most essential category of speech by 
eliminating the balancing of political expression against government 
regulatory interests.
under Richmond Newspapers analysis).
83 See Detroit Free Press, supra (holding Creppy Directive unconstitutional under 
Richmond Newspapers analysis).
84 See Center for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. United States Department of Justice, 331 F.3d 
918, 921 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (sustaining Department of Justice’s right to deny Freedom of 
Information Act request concerning INS detainees), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004). 
85 “Freedom of speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this country.”  
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945), citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) 
(overturning contempt-of-court conviction of alien labor leader that rested on telegram to 
Secretary of Labor about pending case). 
86 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note [x], at 118-19 (contending “that unhindered expression 
must be open to non-citizens, to resident aliens, to writers and speakers of other nations, to 
anyone, past or present, who has something to say which may have significance for a citizen 
who is thinking of the welfare of this nation”).
87 See Solomon, supra note [x] (discussing broad powers for Attorney General to 
identify and detain noncitizens suspected of “terrorist” ties under U.S.A. Patriot Act).  Many 
Muslim Americans fear even appearing at community events.  See, e.g., id. (discussing 
decreased attendance at Brooklyn Pakistani community festival).
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A judicial shift toward treating expressive freedom as a public right, 
and accordingly narrowing First Amendment doctrine to protect only 
political expression, would improve over the present state of 
constitutional protection for political debate and dissent in numerous
ways.  First, the public rights theory would compel courts to extend 
political expression far greater protection against government regulation.  
Unless the government could justify a restraint on political debate as 
needed to protect political debate itself, the public rights theory would 
entail a firm presumption against the restraint.  Second, more protestors 
who faced government sanction would avail themselves of judicial 
process, because courts’ adjudications of First Amendment cases would 
send a consistent message that they took constitutional protection of 
political debate seriously.  Third, the public rights theory’s emphasis on 
robust political debate as the necessary bottom line of First Amendment 
doctrine would justify courts in blocking even some nongovernmental 
constraints on public political debate, at least in wartime.88  Fourth, that 
same bottom-line view of expressive freedom would produce a more open 
and dynamic political process that would widen the variety of viewpoints 
present in public political debate.89
Making political speech the exclusive object of First Amendment 
protection would bring impressive benefits.  The public rights theory’s 
problem, however, is that its proposed tradeoff of broad protection of all 
speech in exchange of deep protection for only political speech entails 
steep, possibly intolerable costs in exposure of nonpolitical speech to 
official suppression.
B. Problems With Protecting Only Political Speech Under 
the First Amendment
1. Distinguishing Political Speech
Although this article concentrates on the practical consequences of 
limiting the First Amendment to protection of political speech,90 the 
discussion will benefit from consideration of a logically prior problem: 
the need to distinguish political from nonpolitical speech.  Meiklejohn 
acknowledged that “[t]he human relations involved in the distinction 
between the general welfare and individual advantage are deeply and 
permanently perplexing.”91  Is art political?  Does the arguably 
transgressive character of pornography render it political?  What about 
commercial information that affects important consumer decisions?  Even 
if any or all of these categories of speech are not inherently political, do 
they acquire political character whenever attempts at official censorship 
88 I develop this contention in Magarian, Public Rights, supra note [x], at 2010-60.
89 I develop this contention in Magarian, Wartime Debate, supra note [x], at 150-68.
90 See infra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
91 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note [x], at 81.
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make them objects of political controversy? 92
Although we tend to experience the familiar as transparent, we should 
not make the mistake of treating the public rights theory’s definitional 
challenge as a disadvantage in comparison with present First Amendment 
doctrine.  Line-drawing problems inhere in the necessity of a theoretical 
explanation for expressive freedom.93  The dominant private rights theory 
of expressive freedom,94 which rejects categorization of types of speech, 
nevertheless entails at least three problematic exercises in line-drawing.  
First, because some concept must bound the First Amendment’s 
constraint on government authority, the private rights theory’s disdain for 
categorical distinctions requires it to stake a great deal on the notoriously
elusive distinction between speech and action.95  Second, the private 
rights theory’s balancing methodology requires identifying and 
comparing distinct regulatory and expressive values.96  This balancing 
process impels courts both to assess the relative importance of different 
sorts of expressive conduct97 and to determine whether a government 
regulatory interest somehow outweighs a conceptually incommensurable 
expressive interest.98  Third, the private rights theory’s negative model of 
expressive rights places defining emphasis on a rigid distinction between 
the ephemeral categories of “public” and “private.”99  Resolving any First 
Amendment theory’s line-drawing problem requires difficult judgments 
about whatever factors the theory emphasizes in defining expressive 
92 Critics of the theory have repeatedly noted this problem.  Objections to Meiklejohn’s 
distinction between public and private speech immediately formed the leading attack on his 
First Amendment theory.  See NELSON, supra note [x], at 270-74 (summarizing and 
discussing early criticisms).  Leading examples include Robert C. Post, Meiklejohn’s 
Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 COLO. L. REV. 1109, 
1117 (1993) (arguing that Meiklejohn “violates th[e] necessary indeterminacy of public 
discourse” by limiting what can count as political); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free 
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 596-97 (1982) (criticizing Meiklejohn’s line-drawing); Steven 
Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of 
the First Amendment, 78 N.W.U. L. REV. 1212, 1225-39 (1983) (arguing against distinction 
between political and commercial speech). 
93 For the leading explanation of the need for some theory to ground free speech 
doctrine, see Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 
YALE L.J. 877, 877-78 (1963).
94 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (describing private rights theory).
95 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1993) (upholding penalty 
enhancement for racial motivation of crime because enhancement targeted “bias-inspired 
conduct” rather than expression).
96 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
97 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1976) (per curiam) (concluding that 
political contributions have less expressive value than political expenditures).
98 See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 357-68 (1997) 
(assessing minor parties’ expressive interest in having option to choose another party’s 
nominee as its own “fusion” nominee, assessing state’s asserted political stability interests 
in banning fusion candidacies, and concluding that the latter outweighed the former).
99 See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note [x], at 1956-58 (explaining private rights 
theory’s reliance on public-private distinction to vindicate negative right to expressive 
freedom).  For a thorough critique of the public-private distinction in the context of First 
Amendment doctrine, see Magarian, Wartime Debate, supra note [x], at 127-55.
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freedom. 
Theorists in the public rights tradition have attempted to generate a 
strict definition of political speech.  Meiklejohn defines the proper class 
of protected expression as “speech which bears, directly or indirectly, 
upon issues with which voters have to deal . . . the consideration of 
matters of public interest.”100  Sunstein “treat[s] speech as political when 
it is both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation 
about some issue.”101  These attempts to define political speech share two 
problems.  First, they fail to achieve any clear, satisfying delineation.  
Meiklejohn’s “directly or indirectly,” Sunstein’s reliance on subjective 
intent and perception, and their shared emphasis on the uncertain notion 
of public affairs seem to preclude a stable understanding of which speech 
counts as “political.”  Second, if we could arrive at a fixed, stable 
definition of “political speech,” judicial reliance on that definition might 
stunt growth over time in our understanding of what concerns should 
become subjects of collective societal deliberation and resolution.  Such a 
definition, for example, might have interfered with our society’s 
emerging awareness over the past half century of the relationship between 
sexuality and political change.  Thus, a stable conception of “political 
speech” appears impossible at best and undesirable at worst.
Efforts to define political speech offer promise, however, if we resist 
the allure of stability and instead consider “politics” as a dynamic 
concept.102  On this understanding, the category of “political speech” 
attains distinction not lexically but functionally.  Meiklejohn wrote much 
less about what political speech is than about what it does: it presents
“squarely and fearlessly everything that can be said in favor of 
[governing] institutions, everything that can be said against them.”103  In 
his foundational explanation of expressive freedom as a public right, 
“[t]he principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of 
the program of self-government.”104  Accordingly, a practical distinction 
of political speech transcends any single, abstract inquiry, requiring 
instead an ongoing examination that encompasses both theoretical inquiry 
and concrete adjudication.  
Although the Supreme Court knows how to differentiate 
constitutional speech protection based on distinctions among explicit 
categories of speech,105 it probably would implement the public rights 
100 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note [x], at 79.
101 Sunstein, supra note [x], at 304.
102 I have previously advocated a similar distinction in the practice of partisan politics 
in the United States.  See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note [x], at 1996-2002 (setting 
forth dynamic party politics theory of political parties’ role in elections).
103 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note [x], at 77.
104 Id. at 27.  Professor Fiss, another leading architect of the public rights theory, 
similarly advocates a “public debate principle” of expressive freedom, under which “[state] 
action is judged by its impact on public debate, a social state of affairs.”  Fiss, Why the 
State?, supra note [x], at 786.
105 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748 (1976) (defining “commercial speech” as a category of expression entitled to less 
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theory most effectively not by attempting a rigid delineation of political 
speech but rather by examining in any given case whether a burden on 
speech undermined discourse best understood as concerning matters of 
public deliberation or, in contrast, undermined speech best understood as 
serving some individual’s interest in personal autonomy.  The Court has 
shown an understanding of how to draw exactly this sort of distinction in 
more limited First Amendment contexts.  In free speech cases that 
involve public employees, the court will overturn adverse employment 
actions that punish expression about “matter[s] of public concern.”106   In 
evaluating media regulations, the Court has permitted broadcast content 
requirements based at least in part on the idea that broadcasters, by virtue 
either of their public licenses107 or their control over communication 
bottlenecks,108 perform a special public function.  In a defamation case, 
the court will afford a defendant’s allegedly defamatory statement 
heightened insulation from liability if the statement’s object is a “public 
official”109 or a “public figure.”110  All of these rules require functional 
assessments of the public importance of certain types or means of 
expression – the same sort of assessment a court would need to make if 
First Amendment jurisprudence shifted toward a focus on political 
expression.
The line between subjects of public and private concern may 
disappear at some level of abstraction.111  Certainly that line’s location is 
than full First Amendment protection); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (defining
“obscenity” as a category of unprotected speech); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 
(1969) (defining incitement to imminent lawless action as a category of unprotected speech); 
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (defining “true threats” as a category of 
unprotected speech); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964) (recognizing 
some defamation as a category of unprotected speech); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (defining “fighting words” as a category of unprotected speech).
106 See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570 (1968) (emphasizing that topic 
about which school board fired plaintiff for speaking was “a matter of legitimate public 
concern on which the judgment of the school administration, including the School Board, 
cannot, in a society that leaves such questions to popular vote, be taken as conclusive”).
107 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-90 (1969) (upholding 
federal requirement of equal broadcast time for opposing political positions based on public 
need to allocate broadcast frequencies through public licenses).
108 See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 656 (1994) (applying lesser 
standard of First Amendment scrutiny to federal “must carry” requirement for cable 
systems based on cable operators’ control over large population’s access to important source 
of information).
109 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (emphasizing “profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” in 
applying more stringent standard of proof to defamation actions brought by “public 
officials”).
110 See Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154 (1967) (extending Sullivan
requirement for defamation judgments to cases brought by “public figures”).
111 Eminent constitutional thinkers have cast the Supreme Court’s commitment to 
personal autonomy in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which I discuss infra notes 
___-___ and accompanying text, as a means of advancing democratic ideals.  See Jane S. 
Schacter, Lawrence v. Texas and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Democratic Aspirations,
[cite] at [d3] (situating Lawrence in a line of Fourteenth Amendment cases concerned with 
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a necessary and proper subject for continual reassessment.112  Understood 
functionally, however, political speech has both value and vulnerability 
distinct from those that attach to other categories of expression.113  Legal 
impediments to personal autonomy may reflect political power 
differentials, but often they do not, and the fact that personal autonomy 
may facilitate democratic participation does not mean that all autonomy 
protections advance democratic deliberation.  The public rights theory 
distinguishes the benefits of expression for democratic debate from its 
benefits for personal autonomy in order to provide the strongest possible 
constitutional support for a functional, robust democratic system.  The 
prospect of judicial determinations about the value of various forms of 
expression may appear troubling, but in this area as in so many others, 
judges cannot decide anything without assessing the values at stake.114
Better to embody such evaluations in forthright, evolving doctrine than to 
pretend they need not occur.
2. Defying the Consensus to Protect Nonpolitical Speech
The definitional problem aside, this article addresses a deeper 
problem with confining expressive freedom under the First Amendment 
to political speech: the tension that pits the imperative to privilege 
politically valuable expression against ingrained judicial practice, social 
norms, and intellectual commitments that compel undifferentiated First 
Amendment protection for most categories of speech.
“the culture and conditions of democracy”); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The 
“Fundamental Right” That Dares Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1899 (2004) 
(positing that “the commitments we make to our principles and to one another in the 
context of associations ranging from the most intimate to those with the polity as a whole [] 
constitute the essential core of constitutionalism”).
112 See Post, supra note [x], at 1117 (positing the “necessary indeterminacy of public 
discourse”).  My understanding of expressive freedom owes much to Professor Post’s rich 
understanding of the depth to which democratic principles require public contention to 
extend.  See id. at 1116 (maintaining that “public discourse must be conceptualized as an 
area within which citizens are free continuously to reconcile their differences and to 
(re)construct a distinctive and ever-changing national identity”).   My difference with Post 
goes to his complete trust in the economic marketplace as the sole conceivable mechanism 
for ensuring the freedom he extols.  See id. at 1118-19 (rejecting involvement by public 
institutions in achieving democratic aims of a Meiklejohn-derived First Amendment theory 
as “[m]anagerial” interference with “the value of autonomy”).  Post dismisses what he 
identifies, in a term that still had bite in 1993, as “collectivist” doubts about the public-
private distinction and the autonomous character of individual decisions in our society on 
the circular basis that those doubts threaten the conception of democracy he wishes to 
sustain.  See id. at 1125-33.  That dismissal ignores real threats that nongovernmental 
actors pose to democracy, and I would rather give the judiciary a role in policing those 
actors than allow them simply to police themselves. 
113 See Magarian, Wartime Debate, supra note [x], at 105-15 (discussing distinctive 
value and vulnerability of political debate compared to other speech).
114 See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9-13 
(1979) (contending that judges are uniquely able to evaluate and balance competing 
constitutional values); Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. 
REV. 697, 711 (1931) (calling for a realist theory of values and recognizing that there are 
many approaches to juristic truth).
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The public rights theory calls for privileging political speech under 
the First Amendment because political speech has unique value for 
democracy.  People, however, tend to believe speech in general deserves 
a constitutional shield because speech in general advances personal 
autonomy.  That belief, which animates the private rights theory’s 
directive to protect expression without regard to category, comports with 
the most common conception of constitutional rights.  The impetus to
protect individuals’ autonomous behavior against government intrusion, 
subject in appropriate cases to superseding government regulatory 
interests, has deep roots in our legal tradition and exerts a powerful hold 
on our understanding.115  Autonomy strikes most people as especially 
salient for expressive freedom, because the act of speaking manifests the 
moral agency that defines an individual in relation to other people and to 
the broader community.116
The present Supreme Court has proclaimed unanimously “the 
fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker 
has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”117
Numerous eminent First Amendment theorists have built sophisticated 
accounts of expressive freedom on the foundation personal autonomy.  
Charles Fried states the essential claim: “Freedom of expression is 
properly based on autonomy: the Kantian right of each individual to be 
treated as an end in himself, an equal sovereign citizen of the kingdom of 
ends with a right to the greatest liberty compatible with the like liberties 
of all others.”118  C. Edwin Baker maintains that courts should understand 
the First Amendment to protect all speech that represents the autonomous 
exercise of the speaker’s expressive capacity “because of the way the 
protected conduct fosters individual self-realization and self-
determination without improperly interfering with the legitimate claims 
of others.”119  Martin Redish posits that the Free Speech Clause serves 
entirely to advance the value of “individual self-realization,” which 
encompasses and supersedes the interest in a healthy democratic 
115 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 122 n.4 (3d 
ed. 1884) (describing natural rights and the limited role of government in preserving 
liberty); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 350 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (1690) 
(positing that the individual is willing yield some freedom to government in order to 
preserve “the enjoyment of the property he has in [the state of nature]”).
116 See C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 979, 1014-
15 (1997) (hereinafter Baker, Harm) (substantiating common intuition that recognition of 
individuals’ moral agency is essential to formation of political community).
117 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995).
118 Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 225, 233 (1992) (footnote omitted).
119 C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 964, 966 (1978); see also Baker, Harm, supra note [x], at 982-87 (describing
considerations of expressive autonomy that justify First Amendment protection of speech).  
Baker argues pointedly that the autonomy-based explanation for expressive freedom “is 
much more intertwined with our normative commitments” than the democracy-based
explanation.  See id. at 1014-17.
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process.120
Some sorts of speech that I will posit as having substantially or 
primarily nonpolitical value, notably pornography121 and commercial 
speech,122 defy consensus, leading to distinctly aberrant or incoherent 
lines of First Amendment doctrine.  But the Supreme Court has enforced 
a broad societal consensus that artistic and literary works deserve 
constitutional insulation from government interference without regard to 
their contribution, or lack thereof, to political debate.123  Similarly, the 
Court’s decisions reflect a broadly shared belief that the Constitution 
should protect categories of nonpolitical speech as varied as scientific 
inquiry,124 frank discussions about sex and sexuality,125 and charitable 
appeals.126  Thus, the Court has consistently extended full First 
120 See Redish, supra note [x], at 601-605 (explaining “individual self-realization” value 
in relation to democratic process value); see also Post, supra note [x], at 1119 
(conceptualizing autonomy as a value that dictates a sphere of expressive freedom “within 
which heterogeneous versions of collective identity can be free continuously to collide and 
reconcile”).
121 The incoherence of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on pornography begins with 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), which declares a broad category of “patently 
offensive” sexually explicit speech, defined by reference to “community standards,” outside 
the protection the First Amendment is supposed to accord to speech that offends the 
community.  In subsequent decisions, the Court, for example, allowed the FCC effectively to 
ban scatological language over the radio airwaves, then struck down a congressional 
requirement that cable television providers scramble sexually explicit programming.  
Compare FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) with United States v. Playboy 
Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).  I discuss a substantive due process 
approach to regulations of pornography infra section III.A. 
122 The Supreme Court has had difficulty even defining commercial speech.   Compare 
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 
(1976) (defining commercial speech as “speech which does ‘no more than propose a 
commercial transaction,’”) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Commission, 
413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)) with Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 
557, 561 (1980) (defining commercial speech more broadly to include “expression related 
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience”).  The Court’s approach to 
commercial speech protection remains unstable and unsettled.  Compare Central Hudson, 
447 U.S. at 566 (announcing four-part intermediate scrutiny standard for commercial 
speech cases) with 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (plurality 
opinion) (maintaining that “[t]he mere fact that messages propose commercial transactions 
does not in and of itself dictate the constitutional analysis that should apply to decisions to 
suppress them” and proposing more thorough protection for commercial speech in certain 
circumstances).  I discuss a substantive due process approach to regulations of commercial 
speech infra section III.C.
123 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd. 
502 U.S. 105, 115-116 (1991) (striking down state regulation that imposed financial burden 
on criminals who published books relating to their crimes as invalid under First 
Amendment).
124 See [cite].
125 See, e.g., Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 878 (1997) (partially 
explaining decision to invalidate broad-based restriction on Internet content on ground that 
ban might encompass “discussions about prison rape or safe sexual practices”).
126 See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422 (1988) (holding solicitation of charitable 
appeals for funds within the protection of the First Amendment); Village of Schaumberg v. 
Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (holding that First Amendment 
protects solicitation of contributions by charitable organizations).
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Amendment protection to those categories of speech.127
C. Unsatisfactory Solutions to the Nonpolitical Speech Problem
Prior advocates of the public rights theory have tried and failed to 
strike the delicate but necessary balance between preserving the theory’s 
essence and honoring the societal consensus that nonpolitical speech 
deserves constitutional protection.  These previous attempts have taken 
two principal forms: (1) expanding the category of political speech and 
(2) proposing alternative sources of constitutional protection for 
nonpolitical speech.  The first approach, although useful to some extent, 
cannot fully address the autonomy concern without undermining the 
method and purpose of the public rights theory.  Past attempts at the 
second approach have lacked force or coherence and have failed to 
address the affirmative reasons why people favor constitutional protection 
of much nonpolitical speech.  That second approach, however, points 
toward the newly viable substantive due process solution I propose in 
Part II.
1. Expanding the Category of Political Speech
When a categorical method of distributing some benefit loses support 
because it excludes popular or sympathetic beneficiaries, a 
straightforward solution is available: expand the category.  In party 
politics this is known as the “big tent” approach;128 in the public policy 
arena, including a vast range of middle-income beneficiaries in order to 
sell the Social Security Act in the 1930s illustrates the same principle.129
In the First Amendment context, the more speech falls within a theory’s 
privileged category of political speech, the more appealing the theory 
becomes.
The most important example of this approach in the public rights 
tradition is Meiklejohn’s treatment of artistic expression.  Art appears to 
lie outside the range of Meiklejohn’s First Amendment; at a minimum, 
127 I exclude religious expression from this list because the First Amendment specially 
protects religious expression, as well as action, through the Free Exercise Clause, at least in 
theory.  See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (effectively limiting effect 
of Free Exercise Clause to regulations that deliberately or discriminatorily burden religion).  
In fact, the Free Exercise Clause, by defining a basis for constitutional protection without 
distinguishing between speech and conduct, provides the closest thing to an existing 
constitutional model for the extension of substantive due process I advocate in this article.
128 See, e.g., KENNETH S. BAER, REINVENTING DEMOCRATS 120-121 (2000) (describing 
Democratic Party’s attempt to maintain an ideologically wide range of elected officials as a 
“Big Tent” approach).  For a brief account of major political parties’ tendency to moderate 
policy positions by building broad-based coalitions, see Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 
[x], at 1961-62.
129 See, e.g., DANIEL NELSON, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 205 (1969) (explaining that 
securing political approval of Social Security Act required ensuring that Act would benefit 
broad group of constituencies).
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his disdain for entertainment media suggests a refusal to attribute political 
value to artistic expression.130  However, in a later elaboration of his 
theory, Meiklejohn acknowledges that a “vast array of idea and fact, of 
science and fiction, of poetry and prose, of belief and doubt, of 
appreciation and purpose, of information and argument” legitimately 
contributes to citizens’ decisions about matters of public policy and thus 
warrants First Amendment protection.131 Struggles with the conceptual 
limits of the public rights theory’s coverage can generate important, 
constructive refinements.  Much artistic expression reflects political 
convictions and/or informs political debate, and no doubt further 
examination and debate of the boundaries between political and 
nonpolitical speech will yield comparably sound insights about the 
political essence of other nominally nonpolitical expression.132
As a strategy for making the public rights theory more palatable, 
however, expanding the category of political speech contains a fatal flaw.  
To whatever extent we broaden the class of protected speech, we 
simultaneously weaken the categorical methodology that defines the 
public rights theory.  As Meiklejohn emphasizes, the First Amendment 
“remains forever confused and unintelligible unless we draw sharply and 
clearly the line which separates the public welfare of the community from 
the private goods of any individual citizen or group of citizens.”133  If we 
really believe, and can explain persuasively, that a given type of 
expression has political character, then admitting that expression to the 
scope of First Amendment protection genuinely serves the interest in 
ensuring robust political debate.  But we cannot reasonably hope that the 
categorical boundary of political expression extends to or past the point 
necessary to allay a critical mass of concerns about the theory’s costs.  
Comprehensively reconciling the theory’s scope with autonomy values by 
expanding the category of protected expression would inevitably require 
either conceptual gerrymandering or elision of any categorical boundary.  
Such compromise would fatally undermine the goal of deep protection for 
political speech, increasing pressure toward retaining a balancing 
approach that reduces political expression to the same stature as speech 
less integral to a healthy democracy.
2. Finding Alternative Constitutional Protection for 
Nonpolitical Speech
The failure of attempts to improve the public rights theory by 
expanding the category of political expression demonstrates that any 
130 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (discussing Meiklejohn’s views on 
“private” speech).  This disdain appears especially vivid in Meiklejohn’s savage attack on 
the commercial radio.  See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note [x], at 86-88.
131 Id. at 117.
132 See supra note ___ and accompanying text (discussing value of ongoing dispute 
about the boundaries of politics).
133 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note [x], at 79-80.
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effort to cure the theory’s coverage deficit must maintain a conceptual 
distinction between political and nonpolitical speech.  The surest way to 
protect different categories of expression while keeping them separate is 
to assign different constitutional status to the respective categories.  
Leading public rights theorists, not surprisingly, have tried to do exactly 
that.  Their ingenious efforts, while ultimately unsuccessful, provide a 
template for a more effective solution.
Meiklejohn’s initial statement of the public rights theory appears to 
acknowledge the strategic risk of leaving substantial categories of speech 
unprotected.  Even as he advocates limiting the scope of First 
Amendment protection to political speech and denigrates the importance 
of what he calls “private” speech, Meiklejohn offers an olive branch.  
Nonpolitical, “private” speech, while not entitled to the ironclad 
protection of the First Amendment, should still get constitutional 
protection as an aspect of the “liberty” secured by the procedural due 
process principles of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.134  In other 
words, the government should enjoy discretion to restrict or punish 
nonpolitical speech, but not without offering notice and the possibility of 
a hearing.  This approach, Meiklejohn argues, properly treats nonpolitical 
speech like ordinary conduct, reflecting the insight that the First 
Amendment elevates political speech to a special position.135 From a 
contemporary, strategic perspective, however, Meiklejohn’s treatment of 
nonpolitical speech amounts to dooming with faint protection.  No one 
who disdains the public rights theory for its failure to protect a substantial 
amount of nonpolitical speech will warm to the theory upon assurance 
that the censor’s iron fist comes sheathed in a procedural velvet glove.
Sunstein’s version of alternative constitutional protection for 
nonpolitical speech appears, upon first glance, far more promising.  In 
one of two alternative proposals for revising free speech doctrine, he 
advocates a “two-tiered” First Amendment.136  Under this approach, the 
First Amendment would fully protect political speech; nonpolitical 
speech would get weaker First Amendment protection that would yield 
more readily to countervailing government interests.137  Sunstein justifies 
this approach by maintaining that the Court already accords special 
protection to political speech while denying or limiting First Amendment 
134 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note [x], at 79-80.
135 See id. at 80.
136 See Sunstein, supra note [x], at 301-315 (developing argument for “primacy of 
politics” in First Amendment theory).  Sunstein’s alternative proposal, which he calls “a 
New Deal for Speech,” emphasizes the politically determined nature of expressive 
opportunities and advocates government regulation to improve the flow of ideas.  See id. at 
263-300.  What I call the public rights theory of expressive freedom contains elements in 
common with each of Sunstein’s approaches.  See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying 
text (describing public rights theory).
137 See Sunstein, supra note [x], at 306 (arguing that “government should be under a 
special burden of justification when it seeks to control speech intended and received as a 
contribution to public deliberation”).
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protection as to several categories of nonpolitical expression: obscenity, 
commercial speech, and libel of private persons.138  Moreover, he notes, 
the Court treats numerous other instances of nonpolitical speech –
conspiracies, purely verbal workplace harassment, bribery, and threats –
as if they are not speech at all for First Amendment purposes.139  Given 
these existing doctrines, Sunstein argues, an explicit shift to a two-tiered 
First Amendment would merely ratify our active intuitions about the need 
to treat different categories of speech differently.
Although Sunstein appears to offer greater assurances to skeptics of 
the public rights theory who fear for the safety of nonpolitical speech, 
those assurances ultimately lack substance.  First, nothing in the text, 
structure, or history of the Constitution provides a basis for bifurcating 
the First Amendment.  Unlike Meiklejohn’s elaboration of the public 
rights theory, which anticipates and addresses originalist and textualist 
critiques,140 Sunstein’s two-tiered First Amendment is nothing more than 
a convenient invention.  In relying on the claim that the Court has already 
moved toward a two-tiered First Amendment, Sunstein makes the mistake 
of building a doctrine on disparate rules that he concedes lack a “clear 
principle.”141  In addition, the argument from existing practice contradicts 
Sunstein’s own normative precept for advocating change in First 
Amendment theory: that the Court is insufficiently protecting political 
speech while overprotecting less deserving categories of expression.142
Second, and accordingly, the substance of Sunstein’s two-tiered First 
Amendment derives from nothing more than his own normative priorities: 
the objection to giving such unworthies as the securities laws, 
pornography, 1-900 numbers, large political expenditures, and the 
autonomy of large broadcasters First Amendment pride of place.143
Sunstein’s bifurcation of the First Amendment creates a structural facade
for his subjective preferences.
Beyond these problems, Meiklejohn’s and Sunstein’s attempts to 
relocate protection for nonpolitical speech share a final, essential flaw.  
Neither approach addresses the basic source of discomfort with the public 
rights theory: that the Constitution should protect nonpolitical speech as a 
matter of right, because people should be entitled to speak as their 
autonomous choices dictate.144  This flaw follows naturally from each 
theorist’s open rejection of autonomy as a justification for protecting 
138 See id. at 302.
139 See id.
140 See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note [x], at 1972-73 (describing textual genesis 
of Meiklejohn’s First Amendment theory in paradox of First Amendment’s absolutist 
language but necessarily limited effect).
141 Sunstein, supra note [x], at 302.
142 See id. at 258 (contrasting early First Amendment decisions that protected political 
dissenters’ rights with contemporary decisions that protect rights of various private and 
corporate interests).
143 See id.
144 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
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speech.  Meiklejohn sharply criticizes “an American Individualism whose 
excesses have weakened and riddled our understanding of the meaning of 
intellectual freedom.”145  Accordingly, his procedural due process 
approach manifestly treats nonpolitical speech like ordinary, unprivileged 
behavior and merely acknowledges the procedural limits the Constitution 
places on every government regulation.  Sunstein maintains that “an 
approach rooted in the norm of autonomy makes it difficult to understand 
what is special about speech.”146  Accordingly, although he formally 
treats nonpolitical speech like a matter of right, he too fails to offer any 
affirmative explanation why nonpolitical speech deserves constitutional 
protection.  Both Meiklejohn and Sunstein rhetorically diminish speech 
whose primary value goes to personal autonomy, treating such speech as 
a second-class constitutional citizen that can only try to squeeze under the 
edge of the protective umbrella that shields political speech.
These defects in previous attempts to locate alternative constitutional 
protection for nonpolitical speech appear inevitable, because until 
recently nothing in constitutional doctrine suggested any affirmative basis 
for meaningfully protecting nonpolitical expression without resort to a 
private rights account of the First Amendment.  In 2003, however, the 
Supreme Court provided an opening for a robust alternative source of 
constitutional protection for nonpolitical expression: substantive due 
process.
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS SOLUTION TO THE 
NONPOLITICAL SPEECH PROBLEM
The substantive element of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ 
Due Process Clauses147 has provided the most important constitutional 
opportunity for the Supreme Court to adjust the uneasy balance between 
majoritarian preferences, as expressed in legislative choices, and deeply 
rooted minority interests.148  Although the substantive due process 
doctrine lacks a straightforward foundation in the constitutional text, its 
resilience over time testifies to our legal system’s deeply rooted insight 
that a constitutional culture of individual rights must accommodate
145 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note [x], at 72.
146 Sunstein, supra note [x], at 304.
147 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV sec. 1 cl. 3.  Substantive due process doctrine has 
developed primarily under the Fourteenth Amendment, which by its terms applies only to 
the states.  See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down state’s restrictions on 
abortion under Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause).  The Supreme Court has 
extended substantive due process principles to the federal government through the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause.  See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) 
(noting availability of substantive due process claim under Fifth Amendment).
148 The substantive due process doctrine has generated an enormous body of 
scholarship.  For a useful recent discussion and taxonomy, see Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs 
and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of Rights,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 841-49 (2003) (emphasizing distinctions among strands of 
substantive due process doctrine).
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substantive protections of essential human activities.  Even as the 
doctrine has taken root, however, the Supreme Court has made clear that 
the potentially sweeping character and necessarily uncertain judicial 
explication of substantive due process149 require judges to balance 
scrupulously the importance for individuals of protected conduct against 
significant government grounds for regulating that conduct.150  The twin 
challenges of substantive due process jurisprudence have been to 
articulate a coherent basis for substantive due process rights and to 
identify the nature of government interests that can properly trump those 
rights. 
The Court’s most recent substantive due process decision, Lawrence 
v. Texas,151 takes up both of those challenges, providing important 
guidelines for the further development of substantive due process.  
Lawrence earned its landmark status by striking down all state restrictions 
on “sodomy” between consenting adults as violations of substantive due 
process.  The Court held that the Constitution precluded state efforts “to 
define the meaning of [a personal] relationship or to set its boundaries 
absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects.”152
Two pillars of the Lawrence majority’s reasoning may portend sweeping 
changes beyond the scope of sodomy laws or even regulations of sexual 
behavior generally.  First, as to the basis of substantive due process 
rights, the Court articulated an expansive theory of personal autonomy as 
the essential value that substantive due process safeguards.153   Second, as 
to the nature of superseding government interests, the Court discredited 
government restrictions on protected conduct that derive from purely 
moral justifications – justifications unrelated to potential harms to 
unwilling third parties.154
These two principles of Lawrence have great salience for a problem 
that no one has previously associated with substantive due process: the 
149 The great cautionary tale of substantive due process, of course, is the Court’s 
wholesale usurpation of the elected branches’ regulatory prerogatives through the economic 
substantive due process doctrine of the Lochner era.  Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45 (1905) (asserting broad judicial power to protect a laissez-faire right to contract 
against government regulation) with Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (disavowing 
Lochner doctrine as improperly invasive of majoritarian prerogatives).
150 The Court initially implemented this balance, in cases of “fundamental rights,” 
through strict scrutiny.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973) (subjecting state 
restrictions on access to abortion to strict scrutiny).  More recently, the Court in the 
abortion context has adjusted the balance in the government’s favor by replacing strict 
scrutiny with an inquiry into whether the challenged government action places an “undue 
burden” on the abortion right.  See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) 
(replacing strict scrutiny with undue burden standard) (plurality opinion).  The Court to 
date has not applied the undue burden standard in any other substantive due process 
context.
151 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
152 Id. at 567.
153 See infra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
154 See infra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
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Constitution’s protection of nonpolitical speech.155 Lawrence affords the 
Court an opportunity to transplant constitutional speech protection 
directed at preserving personal autonomy, rather than collective political 
decisionmaking, from the First Amendment to the Due Process Clause.  
Such a shift would satisfy our deep convictions about the importance of 
preserving a constitutional safeguard for nonpolitical expression that 
advances personal autonomy.  It would also create a more coherent basis 
for assessing the social tradeoffs at stake in government regulation of 
nonpolitical speech.  At the same time, it would enable the Court, 
consistent with the public rights theory, to preserve the First 
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause as a virtually absolute shield against 
regulations that undermine politically salient expression.
A. Lawrence v. Texas and the New Dawn of Substantive Due 
Process Protection
Prior to Lawrence, the Supreme Court’s enthusiasm for protecting 
substantive rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment appeared marginal at best.  Substantive due process doctrine 
had reached its recent high water marks in the Court’s tepid reaffirmation
of the right to abortion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey156 and indications 
from a splintered majority of Justices in Washington v. Glucksberg157 that 
the Due Process Clause might, in extreme circumstances, support a right 
to physician-assisted suicide.158  But the Court had declined invitations to 
155 Other accounts of Lawrence have noted in passing that the Court’s sense of 
substantive due process resonates with First Amendment rhetoric.  See Wilson Huhn, The 
Jurisprudential Revolution: Unlocking Human Potential in Grutter and Lawrence, 12 WM. 
& MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 65, 78 (2003) (suggesting that Lawrence makes substantive due 
process more like First Amendment speech protection by transforming it into “a subjective, 
abstract principle”); Hunter, supra note [x], at 1107 (describing “associational freedom” as a 
predicate for “identity formation” within realm of substantive due process); Tribe, supra
note [x], at 1932 (noting similarity between Lawrence analysis and First Amendment’s 
prohibition on certain grounds for government regulation).  In addition, of course, the Due 
Process Clause has long protected a great deal of speech, through its incorporation of the 
First Amendment’s protections.  See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding 
that “freedom of speech and of the press –which are protected by the First Amendment from 
abridgment by Congress – are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ 
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the 
States”); Rubin, supra note [x], at 842 (discussing incorporation as a species of substantive 
due process doctrine).
156 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obst. & Gyn., 476 
U.S. 747, 759 (1986) (striking down provisions of state’s abortion law because “they wholly 
subordinate constitutional privacy interests and concerns with maternal health in an effort 
to deter a woman from making a decision that, with her physician, is hers to make”).
157 521 U.S. 702 (1997); see also Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 
261 (1990) (upholding a state court decision that required family’s discontinuation of 
daughter’s life-sustaining treatment to be supported by clear and convincing evidence of her 
wishes).
158 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (leaving open the 
question “whether a mentally competent person who is experiencing great suffering has a 
constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent 
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extend the substantive due process principle to new rights after Roe v. 
Wade,159 harshly rejecting claims for due process rights to parental 
visitation rights in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,160 to sexual autonomy in 
Bowers v. Hardwick,161 and to a right to die with dignity in Glucksberg.
Lawrence dramatically shifted the tide, reinvigorating substantive due 
process by sharpening both the doctrine’s affirmative rationale and the 
restrictions it imposes on government regulation.
1. Substantive Due Process as a Guarantor of Personal 
Autonomy
First, Justice Kennedy’s Lawrence opinion makes the Court’s 
strongest statement to date on the roots of substantive due process 
doctrine in the personal right to live and behave autonomously.162  The 
idea that substantive due process protects individuals’ right to make 
autonomous decisions about matters central to their lives and identities is 
hardly novel.  Beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut,163 the Court 
rooted modern, noneconomic substantive due process in personal 
privacy,164 a concept closely related to autonomy.   Griswold linked 
substantive due process protection to the marital relationship,165 but 
death”); id. at 738 (Stevens, J. concurring in the judgments) (finding “room for further 
debate about the limits that the Constitution places on the power of the States to punish” 
physician-assisted suicide); id. at 782 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgments) (stating that 
“the importance of the individual interest here, as within that class of ‘certain interests’ 
demanding careful scrutiny of the State’s contrary claim cannot be gainsaid” but reserving 
judgment on the question “[w]hether that interest might in some circumstances, or at some 
time, be seen as ‘fundamental’ to the degree entitled to prevail”) (citation omitted).  Justices 
Breyer and Ginsburg joined Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in substance.
159 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing women’s reproductive freedom as part of privacy 
rights inherent in due process).
160 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (rejecting claim of biological father to visit child in custody of 
biological mother and adoptive father).
161 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (rejecting argument that Due Process Clause conferred 
fundamental right to engage in consensual gay sex), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003).
162 In emphasizing the importance of individual autonomy in Lawrence, I do not contest 
the valid point that the decision’s concept of autonomy integrates strong concerns with both 
relative equality of treatment and interactions among different people and groups.  See Nan 
D. Hunter, Living With Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1134 (2004) (arguing that 
Lawrence reflects “an appreciation of the mutual reinforcement of equality and liberty 
principles”); Schacter, supra note [x], at [d27-30] (suggesting that Lawrence combines 
notions of liberty and equality, with special emphasis on interpersonal relationships); David 
D. Meyer, Domesticating Lawrence, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 453, 480-85 (casting Lawrence as 
a “family privacy” decision); Tribe, supra note [x], at 1898 (arguing that Lawrence “both 
presupposed and advanced an explicitly equality-based and relationally situated theory of 
substantive liberty”).  Rather, I contrast Lawrence with other instances in which the 
Supreme Court disdained personal autonomy altogether as a value underlying substantive 
due process.
163 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
164 See id. at 485 (“The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone 
of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.”). 
165 See id. at 485-86 (basing decision to strike down state contraceptive ban on “notions 
of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship”).  In emphasizing the family relationship, 
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Justice Brennan in Eisenstadt v. Baird166 moved toward an individualized 
notion of personal autonomy.  “If the right of privacy means anything,” 
he wrote for the Court, “it is the right of the individual, married or single, 
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget 
a child.”167  The seeds of personal autonomy in Eisenstadt bore doctrinal 
fruit when the Court in Roe v. Wade168 affirmed women’s due process 
right to receive abortions.  The Roe Court appeared to embrace the idea 
that the Due Process Clause protected people’s right to make intimately 
personal decisions without governmental interference.169
Eisenstadt, however, came to represent the road not taken.  Beginning 
with its emphatic approval in Bowers v. Hardwick170 of state prohibitions 
on sodomy, the Court appeared to abandon the idea that substantive due 
process embodies broad constitutional protection for personal 
autonomy.171  The key substantive due process decisions that followed 
Bowers neither recanted its restrictive reasoning nor offered much hope 
that the Court would restore a robust concept of personal autonomy to the 
center of due process jurisprudence.  In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,172
Justice Scalia’s opinion upholding a state presumption of legitimacy for 
children born in wedlock disdained any broad notion of liberty in favor of 
deference to traditions of state law.173  Although the declaration of the 
plurality in Planned Parenthood v. Casey174 that “the heart of liberty” 
harbored “the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, 
the Griswold Court followed the pattern of two cases from the 1920s, often cited as 
precursors of noneconomic substantive due process, in which the Court struck down 
restrictions on parents’ decisions about how to educate their children.  See Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
166 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
167 Id. at 453.
168 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
169 See id. at 152-53; see also Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) 
(invoking Due Process Clause to strike down state statute that banned sale of 
contraceptives to minors) (plurality opinion).
170 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
171 See id. at 191 (complaining that “despite the language of the Due Process Clauses of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which appears to focus only on the processes by 
which life, liberty, or property is taken, the cases are legion in which those Clauses have 
been interpreted to have substantive content” and declaring that many of the Court’s 
noneconomic substantive due process decisions “have little or no textual support in the 
constitutional language”).
172 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
173 See id.:
What counts is whether the States in fact award substantive parental 
rights to the natural father of a child conceived within, and born into, an 
extant marital union that wishes to embrace the child.  We are not 
aware of a single case, old or new, that has done so.  This is not the stuff 
of which fundamental rights qualifying as liberty interests are made.
Id. at 126-27.
174 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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of the universe, and of the mystery of human life”175 anticipated 
Lawrence rhetorically, the rhetoric rang hollow as the Casey plurality 
permitted states to restrict the abortion right through enforced waiting 
periods accompanied by mandatory information designed to discourage 
abortions176 and parental consent schemes for minors who sought 
abortions.177  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in 
Washington v. Glucksberg178 comes close to disdaining substantive due 
process altogether, emphasizing the supposed analytic perils of extending
the doctrine and reiterating the Michael H. conception of tradition-bound 
due process jurisprudence.179
Lawrence revitalizes the Eisenstadt idea of personal autonomy and 
makes it the basis of a momentous decision that boldly overrules Bowers
and enshrines in constitutional law the sexual freedom of gay men and 
lesbians.  Justice Kennedy begins his Lawrence analysis by defining 
liberty, the central value in substantive due process doctrine,180 in terms 
of autonomy: “Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes 
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”181
The majority rejects the proposition that substantive due process 
protection requires a specific basis in tradition.182  In apprehending the 
issue before the Court, Justice Kennedy rebukes the view of Bowers that 
sodomy laws merely implicate “the right to engage in certain sexual 
conduct.”183  That formulation of the question, Justice Kennedy insists, 
trivializes the interest of people subject to liability for violating sodomy 
prohibitions.  He posits a much broader interest at stake in substantive 
due process challenges to state restrictions on intimate behavior: “the 
autonomy of persons” in making “personal decisions relating to marriage, 
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and 
education.”184 A restriction on the sexual practices of consenting adults 
represents an effort by the state to “demean their existence [and] control 
175 Id. at 851.
176 See id. at 882 (upholding Pennsylvania’s “informed consent” requirement for 
abortions against due process challenge).
177 See id. at 899 (upholding Pennsylvania’s parental consent requirement for minors 
who seek abortions against due process challenge).
178 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
179 See id. at 720-21 (“We must therefore exercise the utmost care whenever we are 
asked to break new ground in this field, lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause 
be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the members of this Court.”) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).
180 Commentators have noted the Court’s shift in Lawrence from the rhetoric of privacy 
to the rhetoric of liberty in conceptualizing substantive due process.  See Hunter, supra note 
[x], at 1106-07 (suggesting that Lawrence replaces privacy with liberty as the principle 
behind substantive due process).
181 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
182 See id. at 571.  The majority leaves dissenting Justice Scalia to wave the faded flag 
of his tradition-specific approach.  See id. at 592-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183 Id. at 567.
184 Id. at 574.
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their destiny.”185  For the Lawrence Court, substantive due process 
protects not a mere descriptive activity but rather a normative value – that 
of personal autonomy.
2. The Inadequacy of Purely Moral Justifications for State 
Limits on Personal Autonomy
A second defining feature of Lawrence is the Court’s willingness to 
embrace a logical implication of noneconomic substantive due process 
doctrine that it previously avoided: government may not restrict or punish 
personal decisions based purely on moral disapproval.186  The Court’s 
rejection of the essentially moral regulations in Griswold,187 Eisenstadt,188
and Roe189 appeared to reflect an understanding that the state’s imposing 
its moral judgments on individuals’ intimate personal decisions 
effectively negates personal autonomy.  Subsequent decisions, however, 
gave substantial deference to states’ purely moral grounds for limiting 
personal autonomy.  The Bowers Court insisted that “the law . . . is 
constantly based on notions of morality”190 and practically ridiculed the 
notion of due process scrutiny for “all laws representing essentially moral 
choices.”191  The Casey plurality predicated its revision of the Roe
abortion right on heightened solicitude for the government’s interest in 
“protection of potential life.”192  In particular, the plurality compromised 
its emphasis on pregnant women’s decisional autonomy in deference to 
185 Id. at 578.
186 Commentators have noted this feature of Lawrence. See Huhn, supra note [x], at
90-92; Hunter, supra note [x], at 1112; Schacter, supra note [x], at [d12]; but see Andrew 
Koppelman, Lawrence’s Penumbra, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1175-76 (2004) (arguing that 
Lawrence Court simply found the state’s moral interest insufficient to outweigh the liberty 
interest at stake).  Professor Tribe argues that the rejection of moral regulation in Lawrence 
extends only to regulations that burden associational rights.  See Tribe, supra note [x], at 
1935-36.  The basis and scope of that asserted limit, however, remain unclear.  Another 
potential limit on the decision’s rejection of moral regulation stems from the fact that the 
sodomy statutes at issue in Lawrence carried criminal penalties.  Nothing in the opinion, 
however, appears to limit the Court’s reasoning to criminal regulations, and Lawrence 
seems highly salient for noncriminal regulations that seriously burden personal autonomy.
187 See Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 505 498 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“it is 
clear that the state interest in safeguarding marital fidelity can be served by a more 
discriminately tailored statute, which does not, like the present one, sweep unnecessarily 
broadly . . .”). 
 188 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972) (rejecting “deterrence of 
premarital sex” as reasonable justification for law that banned giving contraceptives to 
unmarried persons).
189 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (“[W]e do not agree that, by adopting one 
theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake.”). 
 190 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
191 Id.
192 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992).  Of course, the question 
whether the government’s interest in protecting potential life implicates harm to a third 
party defines the philosophical frontiers of the abortion debate, but a Court committed to 
prohibiting purely moral regulation would have needed, at a minimum, to acknowledge its 
inability to resolve that question.
33
“the spouse, family, and society which must confront the knowledge that 
[abortion] procedures exist, procedures some deem nothing short of an act 
of violence against innocent human life.”193  Although the plurality 
included this interest among “consequences” of abortion,194 it made no 
effort to explain how purely moral disapproval of the procedure could 
carry anything more than a purely moral consequence.  Likewise, the 
Glucksberg Court counted among the “important and legitimate” 
government interests that justified state bans on physician-assisted 
suicide the “symbolic and aspirational as well as practical” desire to 
preserve human life.195
The Lawrence Court reverses the tendency to approve purely moral 
regulations by adopting perhaps the farthest-reaching language from 
Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion in Bowers: “[T]he fact that the 
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular 
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law 
prohibiting the practice.”196  Justice Kennedy underscores this rejection of 
purely moral regulation in his justification for overruling Bowers.
Contrasting this departure from stare decisis with the Court’s adherence 
to precedent in Casey,197 he explains that “there has been no individual or 
societal reliance on Bowers of the sort that could counsel against 
overturning its holding once there are compelling reasons to do so.”198  As 
Justice Scalia correctly points out in dissent, many people relied 
extensively on Bowers if one treats “a governing majority’s belief that 
certain sexual behavior is ‘immoral and unacceptable’” as a cognizable 
basis for a reliance interest.199  Justice Kennedy also contrasts the 
consensual activity that sodomy prohibitions restrict with conduct that 
involves “minors [or] persons who might be injured or coerced or who are 
situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused” and 
with “public conduct or prostitution.”200  Those distinctions imply that the 
state legitimately may restrict personal autonomy only where the 
autonomous decision or conduct at issue may harm third parties or the 
public.201  Justice Scalia casts the majority’s distinctions into even sharper 
193 Id. at 852.
194 Id.
195 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 729 (1997) (describing state’s 
“unqualified interest in the preservation of human life”) (plurality opinion); see also id. at 
746 (recognizing government interest in the “sanctity of life”).
196 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
197 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 860-61 (explaining importance of adhering to precedent in 
abortion context).
198 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
199 Id. at 589 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 
(1986)).
200 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
201 Justice O’Connor’s opinion concurring in the judgment in Lawrence, which relies on 
the narrower ground of the Equal Protection Clause, echoes the majority’s criticism of 
purely moral regulation in the context of legal distinctions among groups of people.  For 
Justice O’Connor, “[m]oral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental 
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relief by insisting that Lawrence undermines all state prohibitions of 
“bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, 
adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity” because such prohibitions 
are “sustainable only in light of Bowers’ validation of laws based on 
moral choices.”202
The Lawrence majority’s rejection of purely moral justifications for 
state restrictions on important decisions situates the Court in a long and 
distinguished line of critics of moral regulation.  In John Stuart Mill’s 
famous formulation, “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is 
to prevent harm to others.”203  This “harm principle” is a familiar, and 
much debated, idea in liberal democratic theory.204  In the substantive due 
process context, the principle mandates that only the potential for harm to 
unwilling third parties can justify restraints on intimate personal 
decisions.205  Justice Kennedy in Lawrence ties the harm principle to a 
fundamental idea about the meaning of due process, equating moral 
regulation with “legal classification . . . ‘drawn for the purpose of 
disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.’”206  Although Justice 
Kennedy portrays this equation as unremarkable,207 it departs 
dramatically from the positions of Bowers, Casey, and Glucksberg.208
The Lawrence majority’s embrace of the harm principle follows naturally 
from its positive emphasis on personal autonomy.  If the Constitution 
protects people’s prerogatives to live their lives as they see fit, then 
interest under the Equal Protection Clause because legal classifications must not be ‘drawn 
for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.’”  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
583 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 
(1996)).
202 Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 599 (repeating charge).  Wilson 
Huhn makes the interesting observation that Justice Scalia and the Court display clashing 
visions of morality, with Justice Scalia insisting on mandatory rules where the majority 
views decisional autonomy as a predicate for morally viable personal choices.  See Huhn, 
supra note [x], at 91-93.
203 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (1859).
204 The classic exchange in the past half-century about the legitimacy of purely moral 
justifications for constraints on autonomy is the Hart-Devlin debate.  Compare H.L.A. 
HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963) (advocating harm principle) with PATRICK 
DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1975) (defending morality-based regulation).
205 David Meyer argues that reading Lawrence as having embraced the harm principle 
threatens to undermine the ways in which moral conceptions of family relationships have 
contributed to socially beneficial family relationships.  See Meyer, supra note [x], at 477.  
Although Meyer rightly identifies values worth protecting, I think his concern rests on an 
unduly positive presumption about the effects of majoritarian morality on human 
flourishing; overestimates the ability of substantive due process doctrine to constrain 
affirmative government initiatives designed to accomplish social policy goals, such as 
spending programs and public information campaigns; and underestimates the scope of 
legally cognizable harm within the meaning of the harm principle.
206 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
207 See id. at 582 (“We have never held that moral disapproval, without any other 
asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection Clause to justify 
a law that discriminates among groups of persons.”).
208 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
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government interference with an individual’s decisions about matters 
central to personal autonomy can only be just if necessary to protect some 
other person’s concrete interest.
B. Substantive Due Process and Nonpolitical Speech
The Court’s reasoning in Lawrence enables a fundamental revision 
of constitutional free speech doctrine.  The Lawrence account of 
substantive due process does not merely echo the private rights theory’s 
call to protect speech in the name of personal autonomy;209 rather, 
Lawrence gives that imperative a more comfortable home in substantive 
due process than it presently enjoys in the First Amendment.  The Court 
should take this opportunity to shift the basis for constitutional protection 
of speech whose primary value goes to personal autonomy from the First 
Amendment to the Due Process Clause.  Under this approach, the Court 
in nonpolitical speech cases would balance the value of the burdened 
speech for some person’s or persons’ autonomy against the concrete harm 
the speech threatened to third parties.  Complementing that change, the 
Court should limit the scope of First Amendment expressive freedom to 
speech whose primary value goes to political discourse.  
These two doctrinal moves would bring several related benefits.  
Judicial analysis of nonpolitical speech regulations would gain coherence 
and force through explicit focus on the personal autonomy value of 
speech claims and the credibility of government submissions about harm 
from expression.  Nonpolitical speech would enjoy substantial 
constitutional protection, with the strongest protection attaching to the 
speech claims that most forcefully served the societal consensus to
protect personal autonomy.  Meanwhile, political speech would gain the 
deep First Amendment protection Meiklejohn envisioned, free from the 
balancing against government regulatory interests appropriate for speech 
claims less salient to our Constitution’s central democratic aspirations.210
The two key features of the Lawrence opinion discussed in the 
previous section – emphasis on personal autonomy as the driving force 
behind substantive due process211 and rejection of pure moral regulation 
in favor of the harm principle212 – make the Due Process Clause a viable 
source of constitutional protection for nonpolitical speech.  
First, the Lawrence Court’s emphasis on personal autonomy’s 
centrality to constitutional rights resonates strongly with the private rights 
theory of expressive freedom and thus with much contemporary free 
speech doctrine.  Under the private rights theory, the Constitution ensures 
209 See supra notes ___-___ (discussing private rights theory’s emphasis on personal 
autonomy as basis for constitutional protection of speech).
210 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (discussing public rights theory’s 
choice of categorical protection for political speech over balancing).
211 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
212 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
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expressive freedom because expression is an essential vehicle through 
which individuals advance their interests, and government interference 
with expression accordingly cuts to the heart of personal autonomy.  
Substantive due process, as conceptualized in Lawrence, embodies 
precisely the same understanding, expanded to encompass all manner of 
self-actualizing behavior.  Moreover, the idea of autonomy revived and 
strengthened in Lawrence reflects particular concern with personal 
freedom to conduct intimate interpersonal relationships, a concern that 
parallels the necessary emphasis of speech protection on communication 
and association between and among people.213
Prior to Lawrence, the Court’s tentative, contingent linkage of 
personal autonomy with substantive due process was too weak to provide 
a bridge between due process and free speech doctrines.214  In contrast, 
the Lawrence Court’s emphatic account of personal autonomy’s centrality 
to substantive due process echoes its decisions that protect expression 
because of its value for personal autonomy.  Just as Lawrence emphasizes 
“an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, 
and certain intimate conduct,”215 the Court’s free speech jurisprudence 
emphasizes the contribution speech makes to personal autonomy.216
Justice Kennedy’s libertarian rhetoric in Lawrence echoes his First 
Amendment opinions, which strongly reflect the private rights theory of 
expressive freedom.217  He has even noted affinities between substantive 
due process and the autonomy concerns that undergird the private rights 
theory of expressive freedom, suggesting that early 20th Century due 
process decisions that protect parents’ decisions about child-rearing, “had 
they been decided in recent times, may well have been grounded upon 
First Amendment principles.”218
Second, the Lawrence Court’s embrace of the harm principle closely 
parallels free speech doctrine’s emphasis on the impermissibility of 
viewpoint-based regulation.  Disdain for purely moral regulation features 
prominently in First Amendment doctrine, generating free speech law’s 
core principle of prohibiting viewpoint-based regulations of expression.219
213 See Tribe, supra note [x], at 1939-40 (identifying “speech and the peaceful 
commingling of separate selves” as “facets of the eternal quest for . . . exchanging emotions, 
values, and ideas”).
214 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
215 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
216 See supra note ___ and accompanying text.
217 See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“At the 
heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for him or 
herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.”) 
(Kennedy, J.) (plurality opinion).
218 Troxel v. Glanville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (discussing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1925)).
219 Prominent statements of this principle include Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-829 (1995) (“It is axiomatic that the government may not 
regulate speech based on the substantive content or the message it conveys …  Viewpoint 
discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination.”); Members of the City 
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Judges and scholars who disagree about other elements of First 
Amendment theory generally agree that the worst affront to expressive 
freedom is regulation that censors or punishes a particular viewpoint.220
The Supreme Court’s rejection of viewpoint-based regulation even within 
the boundaries of speech unprotected by the First Amendment indicates 
the fundamental incompatibility of constitutional speech protection with 
majoritarian judgments about the quality of competing ideas.221  Whereas 
prohibiting purely moral regulation marks a bold step for regulations of 
sexual behavior, that prohibition already pervades the law applied to 
restrictions on speech and expressive conduct.
Prior to Lawrence, the Court’s substantive due process doctrine too 
easily tolerated purely moral regulation, precluding a bridge between due 
process and free speech principles.222  Invoking substantive due process 
as a ground for protecting expression would have permitted many 
government regulations of speech based on majoritarian preferences, a 
notion intolerable to First Amendment doctrine.  But Lawrence, as in its 
focus on personal autonomy, harmonizes substantive due process with 
deep principles of expressive freedom. 223  The harm principle of 
Lawrence replicates the most substantial reason recognized in present 
practice for limiting speech protection in some instances: that the speech 
in question will cause concrete harm.224  One of the public rights theory’s 
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (“The general principle … is that 
the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some 
viewpoints or ideas at the expense or others.”); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 
U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no 
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its 
content.”).
220 Compare MEIKLEJOHN, supra note [x], at 26 (positing as “the vital point” of free 
speech theory “that no suggestion of policy shall be denied a hearing because it is on one 
side of the issue rather than another”) with Fried, supra note [x], at 225 (“Government may 
not suppress or regulate speech because it does not like its content . . . .  If government 
regulates the time, place or manner of speech, it must regulate in a way that does not take 
sides between competing ideas.”).
221 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (accepting assumption that 
municipal penalty for display of objects intended to arouse anger or alarm restricted only 
unprotected “fighting words” but nonetheless striking down penalty under the First 
Amendment).  For a discussion of R.A.V. as an exemplar of rights doctrines’ focus on 
preventing improperly motivated regulations, see Tribe, supra note [x], at 1932-33; see also
Hunter, supra note [x], at 1115-16 (similarly noting Lawrence Court’s emphasis on the 
legitimacy of the government’s ground for regulation).
222 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
223 Professor Baker advances a distinctively robust autonomy-centered theory of 
expressive freedom, arguing that harm should not justify regulation of speech because the 
autonomy values he views as justifying speech protection supersede society’s interest in 
preventing harm.  See Baker, Harm, supra note [x], at 992.  Baker’s argument appears to 
depend on the idea that speech is a distinctive exercise of “liberty,” a notion that further 
depends on his conception of speech as operating nonviolently and noncoercively.  See id. at 
986 (defining protected expression).  I do not believe Baker successfully distinguishes 
speech from action that similarly advances liberty without resort to coercion and violence 
or, in the alternative, successfully distinguishes “harmful” effects of speech from coercive or 
violent effects.
224 The harm principle stands behind most of the present doctrines by which the 
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core principles is that fear of harm has no salience in political speech 
cases, except in circumstances where the speech at issue threatens to 
render debate itself impossible.225 Lawrence allows that principle to stand 
under the First Amendment while providing a sensible guideline for 
evaluation of nonpolitical speech claims. 
Enlisting substantive due process to protect nonpolitical speech would 
improve upon present free speech doctrine by employing a different, 
more theoretically coherent constitutional principle to trigger searching 
judicial review of burdens on speech that primarily advances personal 
autonomy rather than political discourse.  Under present First 
Amendment doctrine, which encompasses political and nonpolitical 
speech, a court will subject a regulation to heightened scrutiny simply 
because the regulation targets or burdens an activity classified as 
expressive.  In contrast, a Lawrence-derived substantive due process 
shield for nonpolitical speech would subject a regulation of such speech 
to searching judicial review because the speech advanced personal 
autonomy.  This linkage does not imply that all expression is entitled to 
substantive due process protection, nor does it obscure the Court’s 
established commitment to protecting various kinds of nonexpressive 
conduct under the Due Process Clause.226  Rather, in light of Lawrence, 
the Due Process Clause should protect behavior that advances personal 
autonomy, whether or not the behavior has the descriptive characteristics 
of “speech.”227   As a practical matter, however, expression is a category 
Supreme Court excludes certain categories of speech, such as incitement and true threats, 
from First Amendment protection.  See supra note ___ and accompanying text (listing 
categories of unprotected speech).  The glaring exception is the obscenity doctrine.  See infra
notes ___-___ and accompanying text (contending that acceptance of harm principle as 
barometer of justifiable speech restrictions requires rejection of Supreme Court’s present 
basis for permitting obscenity regulations).  Concerns about harm also explain Supreme 
Court decisions that uphold speech restrictions under balancing analysis.  See, e.g., Austin 
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990) (upholding state’s restriction 
on corporate political expenditures under strict scrutiny because state had compelling 
interest in preventing “a danger of real or apparent corruption”). 
225 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.  This position compels, among other 
things, full protection for political statements that insult or deride specified groups of 
people.  An aspiration of the public rights theory is that its affirmative First Amendment 
commitment to robust public debate would increase real opportunities to answer such 
hateful expression, which often targets people and groups for whom a merely formal right to 
respond with “more speech” rings hollow.  See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note [x], at 
1983-85 (describing public rights theory’s substantive conception of expressive freedom).
226 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (describing present substantive due 
process protections for various nonexpressive activities).
227 By making nonpolitical speech claims turn on the importance of the speech in 
question for personal autonomy, this due process approach would circumvent the speech-
action distinction that Robert Bork emphasized to undermine the logic of protecting 
nonpolitical speech under the First Amendment.  See Bork, supra note [x], at 25 (contending 
that First Amendment cannot protect merely self-gratifying speech because no principle 
permits distinction between self-gratifying speech and self-gratifying action).   Of course, 
shifting nonpolitical speech protection to the Due Process Clause would also require judges 
to elaborate and implement legal values, an approach that could hardly have less affinity 
with Bork’s jurisprudence.  See id. at 28 (arguing that commitment to neutral principles 
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of behavior especially likely to serve and reflect a person’s autonomy and 
individuality.  Moreover, in classic substantive due process terms, the 
Free Speech Clause generates penumbras228 or implications229 that make 
expression the First Amendment does not protect an especially logical 
object of substantive due process protection.
Applying Lawrence to nonpolitical speech claims would avoid the 
pitfalls of previous attempts in the public rights tradition to differentiate 
constitutional protections of political and nonpolitical speech.230  Unlike 
Meiklejohn’s procedural due process salve,231 substantive due process would 
provide meaningful protection to speech that advances personal autonomy, 
reflecting the insight that nonpolitical speech, to the extent it serves the 
interest of personal autonomy, deserves a substantially greater constitutional 
shield than ordinary behavior.  Unlike Sunstein’s two-tiered First 
Amendment,232 the substantive due process approach would, thanks to 
Lawrence, enjoy a textually sound foundation and embody a principled basis 
for extending strong constitutional protection to important instances of 
nonpolitical expression.   Unlike both previous approaches, the substantive 
due process solution would advance the positive value of the public rights 
theory – maximizing protection for political speech – while also effectuating 
the insight of the private rights theory – that personal autonomy occupies a 
central place in our conception of constitutional rights – which leads society 
to favor constitutional protection of nonpolitical speech.
Indeed, by concentrating constitutional analysis of nonpolitical speech 
claims on the personal autonomy values at stake, this substantive due process
approach would far more accurately reflect the principal reason for 
protecting nonpolitical speech than present First Amendment doctrine does.  
Under my proposal, the Constitution should not protect speech, nonpolitical
or political, merely because it is formally “speech,” but rather because it 
advances either personal autonomy or political discourse.  Focusing on the 
reason that nonpolitical speech deserves strong constitutional protection 
would give the Court a firm basis for keeping that protection robust.  Just as 
the public rights theory of expressive freedom requires emphasis on the 
bottom line of healthy political discourse, the Lawrence doctrine’s 
requires leaving disputes about nonpolitical speech to “the enlightenment of society and its 
elected representatives”).
228 See Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (noting that “specific guarantees in 
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help 
give them life and substance”).
229 See id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (presenting issue as whether 
law “infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the 
enactment violates basic values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’”) (quoting Palko 
v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
230 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (discussing Meiklejohn’s proposal to 
protect nonpolitical speech under procedural due process principles).
232 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (discussing Sunstein’s proposal to 
accord nonpolitical speech a lower level of First Amendment protection than political speech 
would receive).
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application to nonpolitical speech would require emphasis on the bottom line 
of protecting personal autonomy.
Some may object to extending substantive due process doctrine to 
encompass nonpolitical speech due to the queasiness that reflexively follows 
from any proposal to extend substantive due process.  Those critics assert
that courts should avoid substantive due process because the Due Process 
Clause provides no clear standards for judicial decision and thus invites 
judicial activism.233  Even if one accepts the argument’s questionable 
premises – that any constitutional text provides more than a broad outline for 
a complex and sophisticated doctrine of rights, that personal freedom should 
be a stingy exception to the rule of government power, that judicial 
innovation contradicts the constitutional design – it does not withstand 
scrutiny.  First, the Lawrence personal autonomy principle clarifies 
substantive due process doctrine by providing a conceptually specific value 
capable of channeling judicial discretion.  Second, present First Amendment 
doctrine already requires judges to make all manner of subjective, 
discretionary decisions in balancing nonpolitical (as well as political) 
expressive interests against government regulatory interests.234  Framing 
nonpolitical speech claims in personal autonomy terms, far from increasing 
judicial subjectivity, would anchor free speech jurisprudence by injecting the 
defining concept of personal autonomy into the balancing of the speaker’s 
and the government’s interests. 
The final part of this article considers how a substantive due process 
approach to protecting nonpolitical speech would work in practice.  
III. APPLYING SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS TO 
NONPOLITICAL SPEECH
233 See, e.g., Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992):
As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the 
concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible 
decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.  
The doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost 
care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.  
Id. at 125 (citation omitted).  Critics might also point out that the Supreme Court has 
barred substantive due process claims where a specific constitutional guarantee is available 
to challenge the conduct at issue.  See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (barring 
substantive due process claim against police for excessive force because plaintiff could have 
raised claim under Fourth Amendment).  Lower courts have invoked Graham to bar 
substantive due process claims because the plaintiffs could have sued under the First 
Amendment.  See Hufford v. McEnaney, 249 F. 3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2001) (firefighter’s claim 
that department fired him for reporting coworkers’ misconduct); Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 
F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (prisoners’ claim of retaliation for filing lawsuits).  Peter 
Rubin has argued persuasively that only a narrow reading of Graham, limited to using 
specific rights guarantees to define the ceilings of substantive due process claims, comports 
with established rights jurisprudence.  See Rubin, supra note [x], at 865.  In any event, my 
proposal would obviate the Graham problem for nonpolitical speech claims, because those 
claims would not properly arise under the First Amendment. 
234 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (discussing judicial line-drawing 
necessary under present First Amendment doctrine).
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Shifting constitutional protection for nonpolitical speech from the 
First Amendment to the Due Process Clause would work a substantial 
change in the law.  On the First Amendment side of the fence, political 
speech would enjoy stronger protection than it now does, because no 
other categories of speech would complicate the public rights theory’s 
elevation of political speech to the highest constitutional priority.235  This 
section briefly explores the practical implications of my proposed shift 
for several controversies involving nonpolitical speech.  Courts would 
allow government to regulate speech not substantially related to personal 
autonomy based on credible showings of potential harm.  Speech integral 
to personal autonomy, however, would receive protection comparable to, 
and in some cases stronger than, the protection the First Amendment 
presently provides.
One preliminary problem is determining whose personal autonomy 
should matter in the substantive due process speech balance.  The 
subjects of the personal autonomy claim in Lawrence were direct 
participants in the legally proscribed behavior.  Courts would face greater 
challenges in determining the locus of due process claims involving 
speech.  First Amendment theorists frequently have acknowledged the 
parallel autonomy interests of speakers and people who receive 
information.236  Given the plurality of autonomy interests in expression, 
courts that applied the Due Process Clause to nonpolitical speech claims 
properly could consider the interests of receivers as well as speakers, 
according due process protection both to speech that advanced the 
speaker’s autonomy interest and to speech that advanced the autonomy 
interests of individual listeners.  Notwithstanding the vagaries of standing 
doctrine,237 the autonomy interests of receivers would provide grounds for 
institutional speakers to raise free speech claims under the Due Process 
Clause in appropriate circumstances.
The discussion that follows requires two additional caveats.  First, the 
Lawrence Court left unclear its precise standard of review and the 
relationship of its analysis to doctrinal elements of previous substantive 
due process cases.238  My predictions about the results of free speech 
235 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (describing benefits for political 
speech of judicial shift to public rights theory).
236 See, e.g., Redish, supra note [x], at 620-21 (arguing that expressive freedom serves 
value of individual self-realization both by protecting speech and by protecting right to 
receive information).
237 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975) (denying standing to raise 
injuries to third parties).  As I have noted elsewhere, an approach to constitutional speech 
protection that emphasized the consequences of protecting or regulating expression would 
require reevaluation of the Court’s present standing doctrine.  See Magarian, Public Rights, 
supra note [x], at 1988 & n.211.
238 The indeterminate standard of review may simply reflect tiered scrutiny’s limited 
analytic value.  See Tribe, supra note [x], at 1916-17 (arguing that Lawrence, despite 
avoiding the ordinary rhetorical formulations of tiered scrutiny, obviously subjected the 
Texas sodomy prohibition to a rigorous standard of review).  More deeply, the Lawrence
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cases under a Lawrence-derived regime therefore involve a necessary 
element of conjecture.  Second, my proposal would not completely divide 
all speech claims into First Amendment and substantive due process 
cases.  Claimants who challenged government interference with their 
putatively nonpolitical expression would, under my proposal, retain the 
opportunity to contend that their burdened expression had sufficient 
political character to warrant First Amendment protection.  Moreover, the 
First Amendment could support claims that restrictions on particular 
nonpolitical expression would have chilling effects on political speech.  
These sorts of contentions presumably would figure prominently in 
adjudication of free speech cases, but my discussion presumes scenarios 
in which they would not be available, in order to focus on how the Due 
Process Clause would work distinctly to protect speech.
The following discussion briefly examines my proposal’s potential 
effects on three important categories of speech that frequently lack 
political salience: artistic and cultural expression, pornography, and 
commercial advertising.
A. Nonpolitical Artistic and Cultural Expression
The imperative to protect nonpolitical artistic and cultural expression 
against censorship has traditionally formed the most intuitive basis for 
challenging proposals to extend First Amendment protection only to 
political speech.239  Advocates of the private rights theory have made a 
powerful case for constitutional protection of artistic speech based on its 
deeply personal importance to the artist.240 Although public rights 
theorists have finessed the issue by reference to art’s often indirect 
political messages, maintaining the singular constitutional status of 
political speech requires treating a significant portion of artistic 
expression as nonpolitical.241  Under present First Amendment doctrine, 
courts emphasize the value of artistic and cultural expression for personal 
autonomy and, in terms redolent of Lawrence, extend constitutional 
protection on that basis.  In the words of one recent opinion: “The 
Constitution exists precisely so that the opinions and judgments, 
including esthetic and moral judgments about art and literature, can be 
formed, tested, and expressed.  What the Constitution says is that these 
judgments are for the individual to make, not for the Government to 
Court may have viewed the prior substantive due process decisions’ emphasis on identifying 
“fundamental rights” as a rhetorical trap inclined to limit the doctrine’s protective scope.  
See Hunter, supra note [x], at 1119 (arguing that Court’s conservative wing “has fought to 
enshrine the category of fundamental rights as a containment device”).
239 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
240 A very effective recent example is Anne S. Kurzweg, Live Art and the Audience: 
Toward a Speaker-Focused Freedom of Expression, 34 HARV. CIV. R.-CIV. L. L. REV. 437, 
439-40 (1999).
241 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
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decree.”242
Courts, however, have failed to develop a fully coherent justification 
for protecting artistic and cultural expression under the First 
Amendment,243 a deficit that has sometimes led to unsatisfactory 
constitutional protection for important speech.  Artistic and cultural 
expression is especially vulnerable when it explores themes of sexuality, 
thereby blurring some officials’ and courts’ perception of the boundary 
between art and pornography.244   Some decisions have blithely tolerated 
morally based regulation of art, particularly in the familiar circumstance 
where government patronage underwrites censorship.  In National 
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,245 the Supreme Court upheld a statutory 
requirement that federal decisions to fund art “tak[e] into consideration 
general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and 
values of the American public.”246  Although the Court tried to downplay 
the “decency and respect” requirement as merely advisory,247 it 
substantively defended the requirement as an appropriate element of the 
discretion necessarily exercised in a competitive funding process.248
Similarly, in Hopper v. City of Pasco,249 the Ninth Circuit recognized a 
prerogative of municipalities to exclude “controversial” art from public 
forums.  In sustaining a First Amendment challenge by artists whose 
work the city had refused to display, the court concluded only that the 
city had failed to define and enforce its prohibition on “controversial” art, 
not that such a prohibition violated the Constitution.250
More prevalent than manifest judicial allowance for moral censorship 
of artistic and cultural expression has been preemptive or reactive self-
censorship by sponsoring institutions.  The Smithsonian Institution 
endured a barrage of such actions during the 1990s.  First, objections by 
western senators to the explanatory texts of an exhibit, The West as 
America, which forthrightly dealt with such issues as the ideological 
nature of the United States’ western expansion and white settlers’ 
massacres of Native Americans, led the National Museum of American 
242 United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000); see also
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 248 (2002) (“Art and literature express the 
vital interest we all have in the formative years we ourselves once knew, when wounds can 
be so grievous, disappointment so profound, and mistaken choices so tragic, but when moral 
acts and self-fulfillment are still in reach.”).
243 See Kurzweg, supra note [x], at 438 (noting absence of coherent theory and 
criticizing Supreme Court’s medium-specific approach to First Amendment protection of 
art).
244 For a discussion of pornography regulation, see infra notes ___-___ and 
accompanying text.
245 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
246 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1).
247 Finley, 524 U.S. at 581.
248 Id. at 585-86 (justifying “decency” requirement as an appropriate component of 
discretionary allocation of limited funds).
249 241 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001).
250 See id. at 1078.
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Art to sanitize the offending texts.251  Just weeks later, the Smithsonian’s 
director temporarily removed a work by artist Sol LeWitt from a tribute 
to photographic pioneer Eadweard Muybridge because she deemed the 
work, a box with apertures through which viewers observed an 
approaching nude female, “degrading to women.”252  In 1996 the National 
Air and Space Museum cancelled a long-planned exhibit commemorating 
the Enola Gay’s atomic bombings of Japan because of controversy about 
the exhibit’s questioning the justifications for the bombings.253
Nongovernmental beneficiaries of government cultural subsidies face 
similar pressures.  In recent years, fear of controversy within the National 
Endowment for the Arts “has resulted in a kind of self-censorship among 
arts groups, officials of several organizations say, in which applicants try 
to second guess what the endowment will approve.”254
Although public patronage looms large in any discussion of artistic 
and cultural censorship, governments also use their police powers to 
suppress provocative or offensive art.  Cities shut down exhibitions due to 
complaints about offensive content.255  The FCC fines performers for 
expressing controversial or arguably immoral viewpoints over broadcast 
media.256  States prosecute artists or museums for fine-art photography 
that incorporates images of unclothed children.257 Even worse, fear of 
government action, as in the context of subsidies, often leads artistic and 
cultural institutions to engage in self-censorship258  In the wake of the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, numerous institutions suppressed 
expression that might have appeared offensive or provocative in light of 
the attacks.259  As in the controversies about government funding, sexual 
251 See Michael Kimmelman, Old West, New Twist at the Smithsonian, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 26, 1991, at §2, p.1.
252 See Michael Kimmelman, Peering into Peepholes and Finding Politics, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 21, 1991, at §2, p.1.
253 See Paul Goldberger, Historical Shows on Trial: Who Judges?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 
1996, at §2, p.1.
254 Robin Pogrebin, A New Chief Steps in at a Changed National Endowment for the 
Arts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2001, at A19.  
255 See, e.g., Joe Lewis, Watts Towers Show Nixed, ART IN AMERICA, Dec. 1. 2001, at 25 
(describing Los Angeles officials’ decision to shut down exhibit that included images of 
“same-sex dancing partners” and “renderings of police officers and local gang members in 
what many deemed to be homoerotic poses”).
256 See, e.g., Jones v. FCC, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16396 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 4, 2002) (denying 
on jurisdictional grounds poet’s complaint against FCC for branding one of her works 
“indecent”).
257 See, e.g., Chuck Philips, A War on Many Fronts; Censorship: 1990 Was the Year 
That “free Expression” Ran Head-on Into “Moral Concern.” But the Conflict May Only Be 
Beginning, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1990, at F1 (discussing federal investigation of 
photographer Jock Sturges and indictment of Cincinnati Contemporary Arts Center and its 
director).
258 Investigations and harassment by government agencies certainly help explain 
private art institutions’ resort to self censorship as an alternative to adverse government 
action.  See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (describing aggressive federal 
investigation of politically charged art exhibit).
259 See Magarian, Wartime Debate, supra note [x], at 123-24 (describing instances of 
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content has provided the most consistent source of concern.  In one recent 
example, the Denver Civic Theatre pulled down a painting displayed in 
conjunction with a performance because the painting depicted two men 
kissing.260   On a broader scale, the film, television, music, video game, 
and comic book industries, under heavy pressure from the federal 
government, have all imposed highly visible rating systems on creators.261
The common denominator in all these episodes is fear that our legal 
system cannot or will not protect challenging, autonomous artistic or 
cultural expression from majoritarian censorship.
Unless we accept the unsavory premise that public patronage carries 
with it some special government prerogative to impose orthodoxy of 
viewpoint,262 considerations of “decency” and “controversy” should be 
out of bounds when government decides whether and how to sponsor 
artistic and cultural expression.263  Principles of expressive freedom even 
more obviously should preclude government censorship of private artistic 
and cultural speech.  In both contexts, the Constitution should provide 
self-censorship by privately owned artistic and cultural institutions following 2001 terrorist 
attacks).  Much of the art that raised concerns after September 11 has undeniable political 
content, which means it would receive First Amendment protection under this article’s 
approach to expressive freedom.
260 See Penny Parker, Kiss-Off of Gallery’s Artwork a Low for “Puppetry” Promoters,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Oct. 8, 2003, at 7A.
261 See, e.g., Joanne Cantor, Statement on the Need for a Universal Media Rating 
System to the United States Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, July 25, 2001, 
available at http://www.joannecantor.com/senatrat_tst.htm (last visited Feb. 13,
2005) (describing present voluntary entertainment ratings and advocating government 
action to strengthen and standardize ratings).  Dr. Cantor prepared her statement in 
connection with a Senate committee hearing entitled “Rating Entertainment Ratings: How
Well Are They Working for Parents, and What Can Be Done To Improve Them?”  See id.
262 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I regard the 
distinction between ‘abridging’ speech and funding it as a fundamental divide, on this side 
of which the First Amendment is inapplicable.”).  Among many reasons to reject this 
doctrine, a few can be summarized briefly: the government should never develop a habit of 
drawing moral distinctions among citizens’ competing ideas; government funding has 
sufficient importance to make it a practical necessity for many artists; and discretionary 
government rejection of a particular moral perspective strongly implies government 
disapproval of that perspective, raising the danger of a chilling effect on other speech.  The 
public rights theory may also compel a strong rule of government nondiscrimination in 
subsidizing expression as a protective condition on the theory’s heightened tolerance for 
government regulation to expand expressive freedom.  See Sunstein, supra note [x], at 297-
99 (advocating such a rule).
263 A conceivable objection to my contention that the Due Process Clause would 
toughen the Court’s protection of art in the particular context of government sponsorship is 
that the Court, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Soc. Serv’s Dept., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), 
held that the Due Process Clause does not place affirmative obligations on the government.  
That objection lacks force.  When the government establishes a public grant program, and 
then chooses one applicant over another on moral grounds, it is exercising its discretion 
within a course of action to which it has already committed.  That commitment 
distinguishes the arts funding scenario from the DeShaney majority’s account of the case 
before it, where the state agency had taken no actions that would have led it to remove a 
reportedly abused child from his father’s custody.  See id. at 192-93 (describing state’s 
actions in case).   Moreover, the Court decided DeShaney during a period when it generally 
disdained substantive due process doctrine, and Lawrence represents a clear break from 
that period.  See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
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assurances sufficient to deter preemptive self-censorship.  The holes in 
present First Amendment doctrine’s protection of nonpolitical artistic and 
cultural expression derive from courts’ failures to recognize the 
constitutional significance of personal autonomy and to reject morally 
based assaults on autonomous expression.  The autonomy and harm 
principles articulated in Lawrence make substantive due process a more 
cogent and effective source of constitutional protection for nonpolitical 
artistic expression than the First Amendment has been.  Under the 
reasoning of Lawrence, art’s importance for furthering personal 
autonomy would elevate censorship of art to the height of substantive due 
process concern.264  Likewise, the Lawrence Court’s firm rejection of 
moral grounds for restricting personal autonomy should place nearly all 
artistic and cultural censorship out of bounds.265  Justifying a restriction 
on artistic or cultural expression would require a persuasive showing that 
the expression caused concrete harm.266 Ideological biases and “decency” 
canards would not suffice.  
B. Pornography
The Supreme Court purports to accord full First Amendment 
protection to nonobscene, sexually explicit speech.267  The Court, 
however, has shown unusual willingness to credit the government’s 
grounds for regulating pornography.  For example, in Barnes v. Glen 
Theatre, Inc.,268 which upheld certain state restrictions on nude dancing, 
the Court only grudgingly admitted that such performance was expressive 
conduct at all269 and then subordinated the respondents’ expressive 
interests to an amorphous “substantial government interest in protecting 
order and morality.”270  Similarly, the Court has upheld municipal zoning 
ordinances that restrict the locations of adult entertainment businesses by 
minimizing the expressive interests at issue while validating government 
prerogatives to combat posited but undocumented “secondary effects” of 
such businesses.271  The Court has even placed a subset of pornography, 
264 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (discussing Lawrence decision’s 
commitment to personal autonomy as the basis for substantive due process doctrine).
265 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (discussing Lawrence decision’s 
rejection of purely moral grounds for government regulation of activity with value for 
personal autonomy).
266 One possible submission that might satisfy this standard would be a demonstrated 
public health risk from an artistic performance that exposed an audience to contaminated 
blood.  See Kurzweg, supra note [x], at 483.
267 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874-75 (1997) (reiterating doctrine that, for 
adults, nonobscene sexually explicit speech receives constitutional protection).
268 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
269 See id. at 566 (holding that exotic dancing “is expressive conduct within the outer 
perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so”).
270 Id. at 569.
271 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding Renton, 
Wash. ordinance that mandated distances between adult movie theatres and residential 
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labeled “obscenity,” entirely outside the First Amendment’s protection.272
These departures from First Amendment doctrine resist principled 
explanation and threaten to undermine the precepts of expressive 
freedom.
Moving nonpolitical speech protection from the First Amendment to 
the Due Process Clause would sharpen constitutional analysis of 
pornography regulation.  First, pornographic material’s entitlement to 
constitutional protection, rather than turning on the material’s technically 
expressive character, would depend largely on the material’s contribution 
to the personal autonomy of its creators and/or consumers.  Pornography 
producers could not simply run to court, crying about lost profits.  On the 
other hand, courts could not reflexively dismiss pornographic material’s 
claims to constitutional protection based on abstractions about whether 
the material was “speech”; instead, they would need to examine the 
material’s value for advancing personal autonomy.  Second, courts would 
need to distinguish precisely between moral and harm-based justifications 
for restrictions on pornography, allowing only the latter to vindicate 
challenged regulations.  Regulators would have the opportunity to prove 
that pornographic material caused concrete social harms.  They could not, 
however, justify state pornography regulations simply by asserting the 
existence of unspecified harms, let alone by claiming an interest in 
upholding some notion of public morality.
A shift from First Amendment to substantive due process protection 
for pornography probably would produce mixed decisional results.  On 
one hand, constitutional protection for sexually explicit speech would 
increase dramatically because, in light of Lawrence, the Supreme Court’s 
obscenity doctrine is untenable.  The Court’s decision in Miller v. 
California273 permits criminal penalties for “obscene” speech, defined to 
encompass
works which depict or describe sexual conduct.  That 
conduct must be specifically defined by the applicable 
state law, as written or authoritatively construed.  A state 
offense must also be limited to works which, taken as a 
whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray 
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, 
taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value.274
First Amendment doctrine never should have tolerated such a blatant 
capitulation to majoritarian biases, but it has.  In contrast, the Miller
Court’s categorical exemption from expressive freedom runs afoul of 
neighborhoods, churches, parks, and schools); Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 
U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding Detroit ordinances that prohibited concentrations of adult-
oriented businesses).
272 See infra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
273 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
274 Id. at 24 (footnote omitted).
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both aspects of Lawrence that would animate substantive due process 
protection for nonpolitical speech.  First, the Miller test takes no account 
of the autonomy value of obscene material.  The Miller safe harbor for 
“serious artistic value” may provide a basis for considering autonomy 
arguments, but it speaks in cramped, impersonal terms, leaving the 
autonomy interests of creators and receivers of “obscene” material 
invisible.  Lawrence compels correction of that defect in Miller, not least 
because Lawrence itself found autonomy value in what some consider 
“deviant” sexual behavior275 – exactly the sort of behavior whose mere 
portrayal Miller allows states to criminalize.  Second, Miller carved out 
an exception to First Amendment protection based entirely on states’ 
putative interests in moral regulation, defining the “prurient interest” 
prong of the obscenity test by reference to the perspective of “the average 
person, applying contemporary community standards.”276   The Court 
made no effort to ground the exception in concrete harm to third parties.  
Under substantive due process as elaborated in Lawrence, the species of 
purely moral regulation enabled by Miller cannot survive.277
On the other hand, a substantive due process analysis would decrease 
constitutional protection for pornography that had limited value for the 
autonomy of artists or consumers, to the extent regulators could show that 
the material likely would harm third parties.  These were precisely the 
contentions advanced on behalf of the MacKinnon-Dworkin 
antipornography ordinance struck down in American Booksellers 
Association v. Hudnut.278  Because institutional profits do not advance 
personal autonomy in the sense of Lawrence, the only viable autonomy 
claims for pornography would lie with creators – a group that could 
include writers, photographers, and directors as well as models and 
performers – and consumers.  In many cases, creators might face 
difficulty trying to parlay the creative content of commercial pornography 
into viable autonomy claims; moreover, the pornography industry’s 
exploitation of models and performers would likely yield, from their 
standpoint, negative autonomy values in many cases.279  Pornography 
consumers potentially could raise salient claims that various pornographic 
materials made significant contributions to their sexual autonomy.  On 
the other hand, defenders of the MacKinnon-Dworkin ordinance in 
Hudnut maintained that pornography, far from advancing its consumers’ 
275 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (explaining that “statutes that 
purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act . . . touch[] upon the most 
private human conduct, sexual behavior”).
276 Miller, 423 U.S. at 24.  This factor distinguishes the Court’s treatment of “obscenity” 
from its analysis of other categories of speech as to which it has denied or limited First 
Amendment protection, all of which threaten some degree of harm to third parties. See 
supra note ___ and accompanying text (identifying categories of unprotected and partially 
protected speech under present First Amendment doctrine).
277 [discuss new cases].
278 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
279 See [source on exploitation in porn industry].
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autonomy, undermined some consumers’ will, increasing their 
propensities toward misogyny and sexual violence.280  Thus, the posited 
behavioral consequences of pornography provided the most powerful 
justification for the ordinance, which its defenders characterized as 
protecting women from rape and other forms of gendered violence and 
exploitation that shatter their autonomy.
In his Hudnut opinion, Judge Easterbrook offered no suggestion that 
any person’s autonomy was relevant to evaluating the ordinance, instead 
stressing the importance of preventing government from interfering with 
the descriptive category of “speech.”281  Likewise, Judge Easterbrook 
turned the harm arguments advanced by the ordinance’s defenders against 
them, concluding that any rape or harassment that resulted from 
pornography demonstrated pornography’s rhetorical effectiveness.282
These elements of Easterbrook’s decision, while controversial even on 
conventional First Amendment terms, reflect the reality that the ordinance 
faced a strong First Amendment challenge simply because it restricted 
speech.  A substantive due process analysis would proceed from more 
precise premises: the centrality of autonomy for nonpolitical speech 
protection and the requirement of harm to justify regulation.  Had the 
ordinance’s defenders succeeded in undermining autonomy arguments on 
behalf of pornography and in linking pornography to concrete harms, they 
might well have defeated a due process challenge.283
C. Corporate and Commercial Speech
The Supreme Court over the past three decades has developed an 
increasingly expansive doctrine of First Amendment protection for 
corporate speech.  The Court generally treats corporations like individuals 
in First Amendment analysis, extending full protection to most types of 
corporate speech.284  The Court has distinguished from fully protected 
280 See Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329 (accepting government’s premise that “[d]epictions of 
subordination tend to perpetuate subordination”). 
281 See id. at 327-28.
282 See id. at 329 (asserting that any harm caused by pornography “simply proves the 
power of pornography as speech”).
283 I offer no view about the likelihood of making either showing, and my hesitation 
about predicting the result in the due process scenario reflects a doctrinal problem that 
adopting my proposal would require the Court to resolve.  Whatever its other constitutional 
defects, the version of the MacKinnon-Dworkin ordinance struck down in Hudnut was 
drafted in a manner that, as the district court had concluded, almost certainly rendered it 
overbroad.  See American Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316, 1339-40 (S.D. 
Ind. 1984).  The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine represents a singular exception to 
standing doctrine developed in the context of the present, inclusive First Amendment to 
protect against government action that chills expression.  See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 
U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (describing First Amendment overbreadth doctrine as an exception to 
ordinary standing rules).   I would apply the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine in 
substantive due process cases where the claimants showed that the challenged burdens on 
nonpolitical speech threatened to cross into the First Amendment’s domain by chilling 
political expression.
284 See First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (striking down state 
50
expression the category of “commercial speech,” a term of art that 
generally encompasses commercial advertising,285 but even that subset of 
corporate speech gets substantial First Amendment protection under a 
species of intermediate heightened scrutiny.286  Although the Court’s 
protection for “commercial speech” deviates from its prior deference to 
government regulation of advertising,287 several justices have advocated 
further diminishing the distinction between commercial speech and fully 
protected speech.288  In contrast to my proposal’s beneficial implications 
for artistic and cultural expression289 and ambiguous implications for 
pornography,290 shifting protection for nonpolitical speech from the First 
Amendment to the Due Process Clause would substantially diminish 
constitutional protection for commercial speech and for corporate speech 
generally.
The Supreme Court generally grants substantive due process 
protection only to natural persons.  That limitation marks one of the 
strongest distinctions between the contemporary substantive due process 
doctrine that emerged from Griswold v. Connecticut291 and the discredited 
doctrine of Lochner v. New York.292  The Lawrence Court’s crystallization 
of personal autonomy as the basis for substantive due process protection 
strengthens the logic of limiting due process protection to individuals, 
because only individuals can experience personal autonomy.   The 
restriction on corporate expenditures to influence referendum proposals); see also Bolger v. 
Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) (distinguishing lesser First 
Amendment protection accorded commercial advertising from full protection accorded 
corporation’s “direct comments on public issues”).
285 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 772 (1976) (defining special First Amendment category of “commercial speech” as 
connoting “speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction”) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).
286 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 
(1980):
If [commercial speech] is neither misleading nor related to unlawful 
activity . . . the State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved 
by restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory 
technique must be in proportion to that interest. The limitation on 
expression must be designed carefully to achieve the State’s goal.
Id. at 564.
287 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that constitutional 
speech protection did not extend to commercial advertising).
288 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504 (1996) (advocating more 
searching First Amendment review of commercial speech regulations that serve “end[s] 
unrelated to consumer protection”) (plurality opinion); id. at 523 (Thomas, J. concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment) (rejecting Central Hudson balancing test for 
commercial speech “at least when, as here, the asserted interest is one that is to be achieved 
through keeping would-be recipients of the speech in the dark”) (footnote omitted).
289 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
290 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
291 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down state ban on dispensing contraceptives as a 
violation of fundamental constitutional right to privacy).
292 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down state regulation of employees’ hours as a violation 
of substantive due process right to contract).
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limitation of substantive due process protection to natural persons also 
distinguishes due process doctrine from the Supreme Court’s protection 
of commercial speech under the First Amendment, which reflects the 
Court’s general tendency to extend constitutional rights guarantees to 
corporate “persons” without regard to any underlying interest of discrete 
individuals.293  Thus, one important consequence of shifting protection for 
nonpolitical speech from the First Amendment to the Due Process Clause 
would be that only natural persons’ interests could form the basis for 
nonpolitical free speech claims.  Those interests might be manifest in 
certain institutions, such as theater companies or publications’ editorial 
boards, but a claim could prevail only if suppression of the speech at 
issue undermined some natural person’s or persons’ personal 
autonomy.294  This limitation would render corporate free speech claims 
presumptively untenable.
The logic of allowing only natural persons to raise nonpolitical 
speech claims under the Due Process Clause, and the resulting dearth of 
constitutional protection for corporate speech, underscores the Lawrence
doctrine’s affinity with previous autonomy-based theories of expressive 
freedom.  Professor Baker, perhaps the most sophisticated proponent of 
an autonomy-based approach to the First Amendment, has argued that an 
autonomy focus should preclude protection for corporate speech.295
Baker conceptualizes expressive freedom as a shield for “individual 
freedom and choice,” and he rejects constitutional protection for 
commercial speech, broadly defined to encompass corporate speech 
generally, because “commercial speech does not represent an attempt to 
create or affect the world in a way which can be expected to represent 
anyone’s private or personal wishes.”296  The present doctrine of forceful 
First Amendment protection for commercial speech has developed in 
spite of the Supreme Court’s substantial embrace of the autonomy-based 
private rights theory.297  Eliminating that anomaly would exemplify the 
increased clarity a substantive due process approach would bring to 
nonpolitical speech controversies.
In contrast to Baker’s single-minded emphasis on the speaker’s 
autonomy,298 the conception of personal autonomy this article has derived 
293 See Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (extending 
equal protection doctrine to corporations).
294 For a related contention that only natural persons’ autonomy interests should 
ground constitutional rights claims and insulate behavior from constitutional responsibility 
through the public-private distinction, see Magarian, Wartime Debate, supra note [x], at 
146-50.
295 See C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 
IOWA L. REV. 1 (1976) (hereinafter Baker, Commercial Speech).
296 Id. at 3 (footnote omitted).  Baker extends his limitation on First Amendment 
protection to exclude corporate speech generally, including corporate political speech, 
because profit incentives rather than individual value choices motivate corporate speech.  
See id. at 14-18.
297 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
298 See Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note [x], at 8 (arguing that First Amendment 
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from Lawrence also encompasses the autonomy interests of people who 
receive information.299  Under conventional First Amendment analysis, 
the Supreme Court has maintained that consumers gain valuable insights, 
and thus increase their ability to make autonomous decisions in the 
economic marketplace, through exposure to commercial information.300
Stripping away the rhetorical bunting of the First Amendment, however, 
would facilitate a fresh critique of receiver-focused arguments for 
protecting corporate and commercial speech.  First, the due process 
setting would provide space that the First Amendment precludes for 
considering countervailing ways in which commercial speech may 
diminish personal autonomy by manipulating its audience.  Just as 
pornography arguably can erode some of its consumers’ inhibitions 
against rape and sexual assault,301 commercial advertising arguably can 
erode its receivers’ resistance to unfulfilling or even harmful 
consumption.302  Second, even to the extent commercial speech increases 
consumers’ autonomy, that effect may fall far short of the autonomy 
benefits enjoyed by receivers of art and even some pornography.  Those 
forms of nonpolitical expression frequently connect with their audiences 
at deep levels of personal intimacy.  In contrast, the principal argument 
for protecting commercial speech – that it assists consumers in making 
economic decisions – speaks to the less integral idea of economic 
autonomy.  Corporations’ advertisements surely facilitate consumer 
purchasing choices, but so do their manufacturing decisions, financial 
strategies, and distribution practices, all of which the Court’s disavowal 
of Lochner long ago made clear the government may regulate without 
regard to due process concerns.
In addition, the Due Process Clause likely would protect commercial 
speech less forcefully than the First Amendment does because rationales 
offered for regulating commercial speech, as opposed to those offered for 
regulating art and pornography, tend to appeal much more to practicality 
“does not give the listener any right other than to have the government not interfere with a 
willing speaker’s liberty”).
299 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
300 See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (positing “that [commercial] information is not in itself 
harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough 
informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication 
rather than to close them”).
301 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
302 “The economic enterprise does not passively accept individual values as given.  In 
order to increase profits, the enterprise attempts to create and manipulate values.  It does 
this by stimulating particular desires.”  Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note [x], at 19. 
The Supreme Court has shown inconsistency in evaluating consumer manipulation 
arguments against protection of commercial advertising.  Compare Posadas de Puerto Rico 
Assoc’s v. Tourism Company, 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (upholding regulation of gambling 
advertising based on interest in not encouraging gambling) with 44 Liquormart v. Rhode 
Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (striking down regulation of liquor advertising despite state’s 
interest in not encouraging alcohol abuse).
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than to morality.303  States tend to regulate commercial advertising 
because of concerns about consumer protection304 or public health.305
Present First Amendment doctrine gives courts a basis for dismissing 
even those interests as insufficient to justify regulations.306  In contrast, 
the Due Process Clause after Lawrence compels a pivotal distinction 
between merely moral reasons for regulating conduct and reasons that 
rely on a danger of concrete injury to third parties.307  Particular 
commercial speech regulations might fail due process review because 
they rested on insufficiently forceful showings of potential for injury, but 
courts could not presumptively dismiss the justifications usually offered 
for regulating commercial speech.
CONCLUSION
Present First Amendment doctrine, designed to vindicate a negative 
right of expressive freedom rooted in a commitment to personal 
autonomy, does not work well enough.  By treating political expression 
like any other kind of speech and balancing it against government 
regulatory interests, federal courts have allowed entrenched power and 
majoritarian pressure to stifle political dissent.  Conversely, by following 
the intuition that personal autonomy justifies expressive freedom but 
never explicating what personal autonomy means and what government 
interests can properly trump it, courts have created an often incoherent 
system of speech protections that underprotects artistic and cultural 
expression, overprotects corporate and commercial speech, and manages 
at turns to overprotect and underprotect pornography.  Theorists who 
view expressive freedom as a positive public right rooted in the need for 
informed democratic discourse have long advocated a sensible solution to 
the underprotection of political speech: narrow the First Amendment’s 
303 See supra notes ___-___, ___-___ and accompanying text (discussing moral bases of 
efforts to regulate art and pornography).
304 See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 378 (1977) (noting that state defended 
attorney advertising ban on ground that advertising would lead attorneys to provide clients 
with services not tailored to clients’ particular needs).
305 See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 767 (noting that state 
defended drug price advertising ban on ground that such advertising “will place in jeopardy 
the pharmacist’s expertise and, with it, the customer’s health”).  Some commercial speech 
regulations arguably serve purely moral purposes.  See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc’s 
v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986) (upholding restriction on casino gambling 
advertising as advancing substantial government interest in “reduction of demand for 
casino gambling by the residents of Puerto Rico”).  Assuming a state could not show that 
such a regulation prevented some cognizable injury within the meaning of the Lawrence
harm principle, and assuming the regulated advertisement advanced personal autonomy in 
some meaningful sense, a substantive due process approach to protecting noncommercial 
speech would foreclose the regulation.
306 See Bates, 433 U.S. at 378-79 (rejecting consumer protection rationale on grounds of 
ineffectiveness); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770 (rejecting public health 
justification on grounds of paternalism).
307 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (discussing Lawrence Court’s 
embrace of harm principle).
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protection to political speech but deepen the force of that protection to 
make suppression of political expression virtually impossible.
The Supreme Court’s substantive due process doctrine provides a way 
to protect nonpolitical speech outside the First Amendment.  The Court 
has clarified that the Due Process Clause entails substantive protection 
for certain behavior because of the protected behavior’s value for 
personal autonomy.  The Court also has declared that personal autonomy 
interests must yield to countervailing governmental regulatory interests 
only where the government regulates to prevent some tangible harm, as 
distinct from a purely moral affront to the majority’s sensibilities.  These 
two principles of substantive due process, which resonate deeply with 
prevailing, autonomy-based First Amendment doctrine, allow for a 
revision of constitutional expressive freedom that proceeds from a clear 
account of why and on what terms nonpolitical speech deserves
protection.  Nonpolitical expression, which contributes powerfully but not 
uniquely to the personal autonomy of both speakers and listeners, should 
take its place in the pantheon of substantive due process rights, where the 
Court’s prohibition against purely moral regulation provides strong 
assurance against government censorship of unpopular ideas.
This article’s proposal for amending free speech doctrine may raise 
concerns in two camps.  First, some civil libertarians may view it as a 
Trojan horse, designed to impose a substantive value choice on the First 
Amendment while maneuvering nonpolitical speech into a weaker 
position based on nothing more than my own subjective preferences.  
Such skeptics would be correct in finding behind the proposal a 
normative preference for maximizing protection of political debate, but 
both theoretical inquiry and hard practical experience have justified that 
preference.  As for nonpolitical speech, this article refines the public 
rights theory of expressive freedom by taking personal autonomy 
seriously and developing a basis for powerful nonpolitical speech 
protection that actually improves on the coherence of present First 
Amendment doctrine.  Second, judicial minimalists will lament the 
assignment to courts of the conceptually difficult and important tasks of 
distinguishing political from nonpolitical speech and, in nonpolitical 
speech cases, striking a proper balance between personal autonomy 
values and government interests in preventing harms.  In my view, the 
proposal asks judges to draw no more difficult lines and strike no more 
challenging balances than any doctrine of expressive freedom inevitably 
must and present First Amendment doctrine already does.  The proposal
adds the virtue of compelling judges in free speech cases, much more 
than present doctrine does, to articulate and apply the specific values that 
anchor our constitutional commitment to protecting both political and 
nonpolitical speech.
